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ABSTRACT 
 
Vaccines are considered to be one of the most successful and cost-effective weapons against 
infectious diseases. Currently, licensed vaccines produced in mammalian cell lines, yeast, and 
the common enteric bacterium Escherichia coli have their associated technical problems. A 
decade-old R&D project of developing vaccines in plants has yielded promising results, 
addressing the technical issues to a great extent with the added benefit of faster and cheaper 
production. Plant-derived vaccines (PDVs) are therefore poised to play an important role in 
complementing conventional seasonal and pandemic vaccine supply. 
 
This study of the introduction of the concept of PDV and its adoption into the society is a 
prototypical third-generation plant biotechnology with backgrounds encompassing agricultural 
practice, public health, and medical biotechnology research. The primary objective of this thesis 
is to understand the public good and private interests in the introduction and adoption of PDVs. 
Critical analyses of PDV innovation from biotechnology business case studies within the 
frameworks of existing socio-economic, organizational theories, and emerging non–socio-
economic networked knowledge has been undertaken in this thesis. 
 
Among other things, this thesis found that (i) new research-intensive biotechnology small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, with 5–499 employees) can reduce their transaction costs by 
working in research networks (primarily public–private partnerships); and (ii) by forming 
strategic partnerships with companies that have established manufacturing and distribution 
networks, these SMEs increase their chances of accessing capital and other resources. This 
significantly increases the probability of commercial success by SMEs in the highly competitive 
environment of global vaccine business. 
 
It is anticipated that this understanding will help improve the facilitation of R&D, and the 
regulation and production of PDVs in Canada and the USA. Research findings address the policy 
implications for governments, industry, and the non-governmental organization sector. The 
knowledge generated from this thesis will contribute to the optimization of local and 
international research, intellectual property protection, licensing, manufacturing, and distribution 
of PDVs or other vaccine entities/companies. Ultimately, it is hoped that this thesis knowledge 
will lead to more rapid and widespread adoption of new vaccines such as PDVs in developing 
countries, where its potential benefits of scale, lower cost, and shorter production time would be 
best realized. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of vaccines, an introduction to plant-derived vaccines (PDVs), 
and a description of the structure and objectives of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Issue: Vaccines and Biotechnology 
Antibiotics as microbial intervention tools have been used extensively since World War II; but as 
the concerns of multi-spectrum antibiotic resistance rises both in human clinical practice and 
agriculture [1, 2], alternative tools are being pursued. Vaccines are considered to be one of the 
most successful and cost-effective public health tools against infectious diseases to this date [3].  
 
Vaccines in Western society have come a long way from their humble beginnings, starting with 
Edward Jenner’s crude smallpox inoculation initiatives in late–18th century England, through to 
Louis Pasteur’s development of the first vaccine to protect humans against rabies in 1885 [3], to 
the contemporary mass production of clinical grade vaccines using modern biotechnology to 
immunize populations worldwide. Traditionally vaccines (i.e., prophylactic vaccines) have been 
used to produce protective immunity prior to exposure to infection causing microorganism. 
However,  vaccines (or immunotherapeutics) that can stimulate immunity in an already infected 
individual against some retroviral infections (particularly HIV) are also gaining importance [4]. 
All prophylactic vaccines used for routine immunization are effective in preventing diseases [3]. 
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1.1.1 The Science Behind Vaccines 
The success of current vaccines against most viral and bacterial infections is due to the primary 
protection that is thought to be mediated by a long-lived humoral immune response through the 
production of antibodies (triggered by detection of an antigen by the immune system) [5]. There 
are no uniformly effective vaccines against many infections that result in a substantial number of 
deaths worldwide, including tuberculosis, malaria and HIV. Although humoral immunity could 
be important in preventing HIV infection and certain stages of malaria infection, it is the cellular 
immune response that is central to the mediation of protection in all of these diseases. The 
acquired cellular immune response is composed of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells that recognize 
antigens [4, 5].  
 
Ulmer et al. [6] outline the three key components of an effective vaccine: first, an antigen against 
which adaptive immune responses are generated; second, an immune stimulus or adjuvant to 
signal the innate immune system to potentiate the antigen-specific response; and third, a delivery 
system to ensure that the antigen and adjuvant are delivered together at the right time and 
location. Fig.1.1 illustrates these key components of an effective vaccine assembly. 
 
Figure 1.1: Main Elements of an Effective Vaccine (From [6]). 
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1.1.2 Types of Vaccines 
Vaccines can be classified based on their constitution [3, 6, 7]: killed, intact virus (e.g., injected 
polio vaccine); live, weakened virus (e.g., oral polio vaccine); killed, intact bacteria (e.g., 
vaccine for typhoid); live, attenuated (or weakened) viruses (e.g., vaccines against measles and 
the other standard “childhood” diseases — mumps, chickenpox, and rubella); mixture of 
inactivated toxins (e.g., vaccines for diphtheria and tetanus); killed, “disrupted” viruses (e.g., 
influenza vaccines); and a mixture of highly purified complex polysaccharides taken from 
bacterial coats or capsules (e.g., vaccines against Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), 
pneumococcal, and meningococcal disease).  
 
In the subunit vaccine approach, whole organisms are replaced by use of purified antigens (e.g., 
Bordetella pertussis antigens in the acellular DPT vaccine) [8]. In recombinant vaccines, genes 
for desired antigens are inserted into a vector (usually a virus) with very low virulence; the 
vector expressing the antigen may be used as the vaccine, or the antigen may be purified and 
injected as a subunit vaccine [8]. The first recombinant subunit vaccine licensed for use in 
humans was the Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) vaccine. In the HBV vaccine, the Hepatitis B surface 
antigen is produced from a gene transfected into yeast cells and purified for injection as a subunit 
vaccine. Advantages of recombinant vaccines are that the vector can be chosen to be safe, and be 
easy to grow and store, thereby also reducing production costs. Further, in these vaccines, 
antigen selection can be done in a way that the antigens that do not elicit protective immunity or 
that elicit damaging responses can be eliminated. Disadvantages of recombinant vaccines are 
their cost of development, which includes location of genes for the desired antigens, cloning, and 
efficient expression in the new vector. It has been argued that subunit recombinant vaccines are 
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Vaccine Type Selected Disease Targets Vaccine Preparation 
Live 
attenuated 
Smallpox Crude preparation of cowpox infected calf skin 
 
Tuberculosis Mycobacterium bovis BCG grown in media 
 
Yellow fever Purified, attenuated virus grown in eggs 
 
Polio Purified, attenuated virus grown in tissue culture cells 
 
Chickenpox Purified, attenuated virus grown in tissue culture cells 
 
Rotavirus Purified, attenuated virus grown in tissue culture cells 
 
Influenza Purified, attenuated virus grown in eggs 
Killed Typhoid fever Inactivated Salmonella typhi grown in media 
 
Plague Inactivated Yersinia pestis grown in media 
 
Whooping cough Inactivated whole-cell Bordetella pertussis grown in media 
 
Influenza Inactivated virus grown in eggs 
 
Polio Inactivated virus grown in tissue culture cells 
 
Hepatitis A Inactivated virus grown in tissue culture cells 
Purified 
subunit 
Diphtheria Inactivated toxin from Corynebacterium diphtheriae grown in media 
 
Tetanus Inactivated toxin from Clostridium tetani grown in media 
 
Pneumococcus Polysaccharides from 23 Streptococcus pneumoniae strains grown in media 
 
Meningococcus Polysaccharides from four Neisseria meningitidis strains grown in media 
 
Hib Polysaccharides from H. influenzae chemically conjugated to carrier protein 
 
Pertussis Acellular extract of B. pertussis grown in media 
 
Anthrax Culture supernatant of Bacillus anthracis grown in media 
Recombinant 
subunit 
Hepatitis B 
Purified, recombinant HBsAg Virus like particles (VLP) produced in tissue 
culture cells 
 
Borrelia burgdorferi 
Purified, recombinant OspA protein produced in tissue culture cells 
(discontinued since 2002) 
 
unable to evoke a strong enough immune response on their own, so manufacturers add immune 
enhancers called adjuvants [7, 9].  
 
Table 1.1 shows the major types of vaccines, and the related approaches are illustrated in Fig. 
1.2.  
Table 1.1: Major Types of Vaccines (From [6]). 
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Figure 1.2: Vaccine Development Strategies (From [10]). 
 
Various types of approaches to develop vaccines against retroviral infections (e.g., HIV) have 
been reviewed in prior literature [4]. They can be classified as: (i) passive immunotherapy that 
involves passage of antibodies (antiviral sera and monoclonal antibodies) from an individual who 
has encountered an antigen to an unaffected individual; (ii) vaccines that induce humoral 
immunity (inactivated virus, subunit and peptide vaccines); (iii) vaccines that induce cell 
mediated immunity as well as humoral immunity (attenuated viruses, vaccinia/avipox based 
vaccines, retroviral vectors, and direct DNA injection); and (iv) vaccines based on bacteria 
(Bacillus Calmette-Guérin BCG, Salmonella, etc.). 
 
6 
 
Virus-like particles (VLPs) are formed by self-assembly of viral capsid proteins upon expression 
in cell culture systems [6]. VLP-based vaccines have several potential advantages. First, they are 
particulate, meaning they contain many copies of antigen in a repeating array and present 
conformational antibody epitopes, thereby mimicking viral surface structure. These properties 
render VLPs very efficient for induction of both humoral and cell-mediated immunity. Second, 
they do not package viral nucleic acids and are thus non-replicating and very safe. Third, they 
have been shown to be effective when administered mucosally, including orally. Finally, VLPs 
can be produced in a variety of expression systems, such as mammalian, insect, yeast, bacteria, 
and plant cells, which provides flexibility in tailoring manufacturing conditions to the specific 
needs of the product, such as the requirement for mammalian post-translational processing. 
 
New vaccine technologies have been covered in prior literature. Gene-based vaccines consisting 
of plasmid DNA or recombinant viral vectors efficiently induce cellular immunity [6], and would 
potentially be efficient against tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV (as discussed above in section 
1.1.1). 
  
In addition to the above, novel adjuvants and delivery systems are also being developed to 
complement the emerging vaccine technologies. 
 
1.1.3 A Comeback 
Vaccines used to be considered as low-profit, high-risk biological products. In large 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, commitment to vaccine maufacturing competed for 
R&D resources against other products with high profit potential such as those against heart 
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disease and cancer [9, 11]. For the past 15 years, vaccines have been fast losing the above 
connotation as private companies are now turning their attention to strengthen their vaccine 
candidate pipelines. The driving forces behind the above development are science, economics 
and health politics. Some examples of the driving forces include delivery of multibillion dollar 
products such as Wyeth’s Prevnar (the world’s first pneumococcal vaccine for children, acquired 
by Pfizer) and Merck’s Gardasil (against human papillomavirus/HPV). Also, in the early- and 
mid-2000s, pandemic influenza preparedness plans, increased public and private investment in 
vaccines, big pharmaceutical companies losing profits to competition from generics, drying 
product pipelines, and increased regulation and associated costs all interacted to change the 
vaccine landscape [7, 9]. 
 
The global vaccine market, valued at approximately US$16.3 billion in 2007, is projected to 
increase at an annual rate of roughly 13-14% over the next several years—more than twice as 
rapidly as for traditional pharmaceuticals—and is expected to exceed US$30 billion by 2013 
[47]. Based on aggregate data provided in 2008 by members of the BIOTECanada Vaccine 
Industry Committee (VIC), annual vaccine sales in Canada are currently estimated at 
approximately $450 million (public spending about $250 million, private about $200 million) 
[47]. 
 
1.2 Problem: Plant-Derived Vaccines  
The research concept of plant-derived vaccines (PDVs) was proven, and promising products 
created were presented by the author of this thesis in a 2008 publication [12], emphasizing the 
advantages of the plant platform over conventional vaccines, and the challenges facing the 
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introduction of PDVs to address current vaccine manufacturing shortages. It was concluded in 
the publication [12] that the remaining scientific and technological challenges being 
surmountable, the successful strategy for introduction and adoption of PDVs had to rely on 
continued public support as an investment in public good.  
 
Currently, vaccines have been developed using mammalian cell lines, yeast, and the common 
enteric bacterium Escherichia coli (E. coli), but these systems have technical problems that 
include scalability, contamination, and multiple co- or post-translational modifications 
(glycosylation). In addition to being able to avoid all the above problems to some extent, PDVs 
can be produced faster and cheaper [13]. PDVs are proposed to play an important role in 
complementing conventional vaccine supply. The section below focuses attention on the 
potential role of PDVs in pandemic vaccine supply. Figure 1.3 illustrates the probable effect of 
plant production of vaccine antigen compared to conventional production on the lower pricing of 
a vaccine. It was shown that using plants could yield 68% savings in total production costs 
compared to using conventional methods. Table 1.2 shows significant savings that can be made 
by producing PDVs compared to conventional vaccines against HBV in three different regions 
and two different dosage forms, justifying the establishment of a comprehensive program to 
bring one or more products to the market soon.  
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Figure 1.3: Comparative Costs of PDVs and Conventional Vaccines (From [14]). Bars represent 
the percentage contribution of the different components shown to the final wholesale price of a 
vaccine. Each cost component, e.g., R&D, consists of two bars: blue (left) represents 
conventional platform and red (right), plant platforms. 
 
Table 1.2: Comparison of Production and Effective Cost with PDVs (Adapted from [15]). 
Countries Korea  
or India 
United States Korea India 
Production 
System 
 Yeast Plant-derived Plant-derived Plant-derived 
 
Packaging/dosag
e sold 
Yeast-
derived 
10-dose 
vials 
single-
dose 
packet 
10-dose 
packet 
single-
dose 
packet 
10-dose 
packett 
single-
dose 
packet 
10-dose 
packet 
Cost (US$) 0.27 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.075 0.03 
Effective Cost 0.42 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.04 
% Savings*  0 62 81 76 88 81 90 
 
*  For plant-derived vaccine against yeast-derived for effective cost. Effective cost is cost per dose to 
deliver in a developing country immunization program. 
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1.2.1 Challenges Facing PDVs 
Previous literature has covered this issue [16]. Ongoing efforts to produce alternatives to 
established vaccines—such as those to Hepatitis B Virus (HBV), HPV, and rotaviruses—face 
competition from the enormous and well-established conventional capacity for production of 
generics, as in the case of HBV, which is cheap enough to be included in the universal infant 
vaccination bundle recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) Expanded 
Programme on Immunization. The other challenge is the huge capital required in development 
and production plants for the new HPV and rotavirus vaccines, which discourages big 
pharmaceutical companies from diversifying their means of production. It is thus argued that 
PDV technologies capitalize on their competitive advantages—the huge range in scalability and 
speed of response—ideally suited for niche “orphan vaccines” (e.g., Lassa fever and the South 
American haemorrhagic fever viruses), or emerging disease vaccines with pandemic potential 
(see section on Pandemic Preparedness below), or even bio-terror threats, where other means of 
production are simply too slow to respond [16]. The lack of momentum in pull forces from 
governments and markets for PDVs has been reviewed by researchers [14] and ways to 
potentially address them are discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.1.1). 
 
Currently, inactivated seasonal influenza vaccines are produced in embryonated eggs. The egg-
based systems suffer from limited capacity, poor flexibility, and restricted responsiveness, 
decreasing the effectiveness of this system in a pandemic [17]; in response to the associated 
problems, alternative systems to complement supply have been proposed. The egg-based 
seasonal influenza vaccines are produced twice yearly and take six months after the 
identification of influenza strains by WHO global influenza surveillance system [18]. Other 
11 
 
platforms require a shorter time to produce vaccines, e.g., plant-based (14 days) and insect-cell 
culture and recombinant baculovirus cultures (11 weeks) [9, 19]. Considering competitive 
advantages in terms of higher speed and lower cost that are of great importance in pandemics, 
PDVs are clearly positioned to complement, if not substitute, the conventional pandemic (and 
seasonal) influenza vaccine supply. There is ample evidence from research groups worldwide 
that suggest plants may be a uniquely viable vehicle for rapid response or even conventional 
vaccine production for the prevention of influenza [16]. 
 
1.2.2 Social Issues  
The potential advantages of PDVs, namely, that they are safe, cheap, and fast to produce, have 
been already established. PDVs fit within the scientific areas of genetically modified (GM) crops 
and vaccines. PDVs thus inherit some controversies of both GM crops and vaccines. Past 
experiences of social dynamics with GM crops suggest that society reacts to controversies. The 
controversies in this case are inherited from GM crops: the perception of the possibilities of 
contamination of the food supply (supported by scientific evidence, see section 1.2.3), the 
potential for the development of immunological tolerance to orally dosed or edible vaccines, and 
the potential for regulatory and production problems [14]. While perception of the possibilities of 
contamination of the food supply is within the realm of social sciences understanding, the rest 
are more technical and political. Potential regulatory problems and perception of the possibility 
of contamination of the food supply would involve the public and voluntary sectors (areas A & E 
respectively in Figure 1.4 below), which is discussed further down in this section. Anticipating 
and addressing social challenges to the introduction of this new technology is important for fully 
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realizing the potential benefits in developing and underdeveloped countries where the vaccines 
are much needed [21]. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Picciotto Model (From [20]). G corresponds to the shaded area in the middle. 
Mini legend: Area A represents public- or state- sector produced public goods; the market sector, 
area C, produces private, market goods; and area E, the voluntary sector/civil society groups, 
produces common pool goods. Overlap area B public, or regulated private corporations, produce toll 
goods, overlap area D, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), produce civil goods; overlap area F, 
hybrid organizations, produce public goods. For more details refer to section 3.2.2. 
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Figure 1.5: The PDV Hype Curve (From [14]). 
 
The “hype curve” has been used to track public perception and sentiments around PDVs [14]. 
This curve (Figure 1.5) shows shifts in publicity generated around PDVs as a function of time. 
Favourable publicity up until early 2002 was fuelled largely by the idea of edible vaccines [11], 
as shown by the rising curve. This rise was brought down by fears of contamination of the food 
chain, and diminished further with concerns about regulatory problems and the lack of success 
and further development. Two outcomes are predicted: Outcome 1 represents the view of the 
future—a possible toned-down version of the pre-2002 era hype.  The original concept of cheap 
edible vaccines has given way to a realization that there is a need for formulated products that 
may be injectable to be produced in clinical good manufacturing process (cGMP) facilities [16]. 
This transformation can be considered a practical compromise between the ideal world and the 
real world restrictions. Outcome 2 represents what might happen if industry and governments do 
not take up the technology: the hype will die away to levels that may make it very difficult in 
terms of public sentiment and negativity to fund any future plant-based production platform, 
however useful these may be [14]. 
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Another aspect of the social issue is the emerging public resistance to immunization and 
vaccines. Dr. Lorne Babiuk, a prominent Canadian immunologist and vaccine expert indicates 
the presence of significant anti-vaccine lobby that links autism to immunization [22]. In an 
interview [23], Dr. Babiuk describes the lobby to be comprised of a variety of interest groups 
with a ‘fluid’ approach in generating momentum against vaccines. An example in this case is the 
lobby joining forces with the religious right to oppose HPV vaccine in Canada. Dr. Babiuk’s 
prediction is supported by the drop in HPV vaccination rates in ON and the prairie provinces 
occurring concurrently with religious groups’ and social commentators’ opposition to it [24]. 
Media reports about the fear of vaccination and the rumours fuelling the fears are spilling over 
into the developing and underdeveloped countries, causing setbacks to immunization programs 
in regions where mortality- and morbidity-due infectious diseases are a major concern [25]. Dr. 
Gregory A. Poland is Director of Mayo Vaccine Research Group at the Mayo Clinic and 
Foundation, and a member of the steering committee of the US National Network for 
Immunization Information. In his public discourse, he explores the concepts of innumeracy and 
denialism as archetypes that explain the dominant modes of thinking by anti-vaccine proponents 
[26]. Dr. Poland’s group is involved in developing and testing novel vaccines, understanding the 
genetic “drivers” of immune response to viral vaccines, and developing biological defence 
vaccines. Development and testing of such novel vaccines need regulatory oversight which has 
been discussed below. 
 
 
 
15 
 
1.2.3 Regulatory Issues  
It has been suggested that PDVs be grown in an agricultural setting to take advantage of full 
potential of the agricultural scale of production. But as with any GM crops grown in the fields, 
there are regulatory issues that arise, including pollination and cross-pollination, and 
containment of such plants [27]. Introduction and adoption of disruptive technologies involve 
certain risks and associated liabilities. Failure to contain the flow of genes would result in 
regulatory liability involving the regulatory agencies, industry organizations, and civil society 
groups. If the public perceives the resulted liabilities to be linked either directly or indirectly to 
the innovative product, consumers will be less likely to purchase the product [21]. Topics that 
are discussed in this subsection include trust in regulatory institutions, the current post-marketing 
surveillance program for drugs and vaccines in Canada, and suggestions to build trust in 
regulatory institutions. 
 
Stuart Smyth’s doctoral thesis [21] elaborates on the management of potential GM liability 
issues, including those surrounding PDVs. Smyth presents the growing mistrust between the 
public and the industry, and he attempts to provide solutions to address this issue [21]. As PDVs 
are third-generation plant biotechnology products, it is important to learn about historical risks 
and liabilities associated with first- (agronomic qualities) and second-generation (product-quality 
characteristics) plant biotechnology products. Further reading about GM contamination and 
controversies is provided [30–38]. 
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In Figure 1.4, area A represents regulatory agencies, area C, the industry organizations, and area 
E, the civil society groups. The overlap area of D between the civil society groups and industry is 
important in the commercialization and adoption of transformative technologies, and it is 
discussed later in this section.   
 
The absence of two-way trust between society and the industry poses real challenges to the 
process of informed communication [21]. Consumers do not trust what the industry tells them, 
and the industry ignores consumers’ demands, convinced their voices represent a minority of 
consumers. The institutional framework suggests that when there is a gap in the level of trust 
between industry and society, the only remaining stakeholder that can provide some basic level 
of reassurance in this situation is the regulatory agency [21]. In this case Health Canada fills this 
role. 
 
Within the Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) of Health Canada, post-market 
surveillance activities for all health products (GM and otherwise) is the responsibility of the 
Marketed Health Products Directorate (MHPD). MHPD reviews health product safety data, 
conducts risk assessments, and evaluates therapeutic effectiveness of marketed health products. 
MHPD can take appropriate action ranging from informing the public and health care 
community of new product safety information, to removing the product from the market, should 
a health product’s safety, efficacy, or quality come into question [28].  
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It is therefore suggested that market surveillance and monitoring of GM crops (including PDVs) 
be undertaken by a multifaceted organization of industry, regulators, and civil society groups to 
provide a basic and solid level of confidence for these products, in an increasingly sceptical 
society [21], i.e., a shift from area A and C to overlap area G in Figure 1.4.  Ways to instil 
consumer trust in the food safety system is speculated below.1 Currently, only the Canadian 
Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring Program coordinated by MHPD allows health care 
professionals and consumers to report adverse reactions within their post-market surveillance 
activities of health products [28]. The challenge identified in Canada is that the current science-
based regulatory process has no official capacity to include comments or concerns from the 
consuming public [21]. Furthermore, previous attempts to incorporate the public’s opinion have 
mostly provided unsatisfactory results in Canada [21]. 
 
Regulatory mechanisms are in place to ensure the introduction of only safe and effective 
products into the society and environment. These mechanisms should be balanced so 
 
 
1 The interaction of C and E is institutionally through civil courts and media (discussed in details in section 3.2.1). Smyth [21] 
also suggests the overlap D between firms C and the civil society E can also be occupied by agencies or independent third parties 
that are involved in testing for safety. According to their website [29], the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is a leading 
science-based non-profit group working for a healthy environment and a safer world. UCS combines independent scientific 
research and citizen action to develop innovative, practical solutions and to secure responsible changes in government policy, 
corporate practices, and consumer choices. As UCS does independent scientific research in areas including food safety to author 
position papers for national policy development, they would be a good candidate to play a leading role in making food safety 
issues known publicly. An independent third party critical analysis (by groups such as UCS) of varieties approved, or in approval 
process by federal regulatory agencies, would make a positive impact in instilling consumer trust in the food safety system. 
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that innovation is not deterred by excessive regulations. The introduction of first-generation GM 
crops (agronomic qualities such as traits for biotic herbicide resistance and abiotic stress 
tolerance) serves as a good example to illustrate this challenge. The rigours of the regulatory 
requirements, in terms of the costs associated with conducting studies necessary to meet 
thedemands of the regulators (for aspects such as gene flow, allergenicity, and toxicity) have 
been pushing public researchers out of the variety-development industry [39].  Public research 
institutions take a serious blow in this situation because they have limited budgets and simply do 
not have the finances to undertake the expensive research required to satisfy regulators. This 
situation necessitates commercialization of new varieties to be only performed by large 
multinational developers, thereby having a potentially large negative impact on the continuing 
development of varieties that are best suited for public good in Canada and abroad.  
 
1.3 Objective 
The primary objective of this research project is to explore whether a small- and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) partnership would be a good business model for the introduction and adoption 
of PDVs. In the kind of business model under investigation, a research-intensive privately or 
publicly traded biotechnology SME usually forms public–private partnerships (PPP) in research 
networks, and strategic partnerships with large pharmaceutical/biotechnology companies for 
manufacture and/or distribution. The concept of PPP is described in section 2.2.4.  
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1.4  Method 
Research into the adoption and governance of transformative technologies for social benefit 
crosses boundaries of traditional disciplinary studies. Interdisciplinary discourse allows the 
multi-perspective flow of ideas and access to researchers from a variety of disciplines. Research 
in this thesis builds on disciplinary knowledge and frameworks from the traditional areas of 
science, social sciences, and applied economics/business to answer the broader research 
questions.  The thesis uses scientific papers for about 25% primary references and publicly 
available sources for the rest. Figure 1.6 illustrates the interrelation between the key elements.   
 
Figure 1.6: Spheres of Interdisciplinary Research. 
 
This interdisciplinary research project takes the following approach: 
• Understanding the scientific principles and advancements behind vaccines and life 
sciences/biotechnology.  
• Gaining a basic understanding of economic frameworks in the areas of knowledge 
generation and use [40] and organizational forms [41]. Non-economic dimensions of 
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networked knowledge are also included. Background knowledge in markets and industry 
analysis for vaccines is included. 
• Background reading in social responsibility, dynamics, and acceptability. 
 
Special emphasis has been placed on the detailed study of issues of governance and IP 
mechanisms because of the transformative/disruptive nature of PDV innovation and its potential 
in terms of benefiting the broad focus and interest of the society. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 will present a review of the institutions involved in vaccine innovation. In Chapter 3, 
socio-economic models attempting to depict the process of innovation are reviewed. This is 
followed by a discussion of types of knowledge, economics of transactions, and non-economic 
dimensions of networked knowledge. Emphasis is on theoretical frameworks developed by 
Alston, Norton, and Pardey [40] (economic), and Mahoney [41] (organizational form).  
 
Chapter 4 presents a critical analysis of PDV innovation through the examination of two 
biotechnology business case studies illustrating phases of development within the theoretical 
frameworks from Chapter 3. The generation and use of knowledge, the agreements secured to 
administer, and the institutional structures that facilitate each phase are presented within the two 
biotechnology business case studies. Chapter 5 concludes research findings and discusses policy 
implications for governments and the industry. 
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1.5.1 Positioning of the Thesis 
The thesis attempts to understand and facilitate the adoption of PDVs for social benefit globally 
and access to vaccines in developing countries. It has been widely acknowledged that new 
vaccine innovations, including PDVs, have usually originated in developed countries. 
Developing countries struggle regularly for access to basic public health, nutrition, education, 
and medicines. Popular policies in developed countries have focused on ensuring access to 
medicines (e.g., CAMR, see section 2.3) and basic public health in the developing and 
underdeveloped countries. Mechanisms of ensuring access, including humanitarian licensing and 
technology transfer, are discussed in section 2.3. 
 
A hypothetical socio-economic case study was done in 2009 by Castle et al. [42] of a PDV 
(against Hepatitis B) technology diffusion model in India. It was suggested in the study that 
institutional hurdles to a widespread diffusion of the technology was an impediment that still 
needs to be overcome. The first step in overcoming the hurdles (above) would be R&D, 
licensure, and production of a pioneer PDV in a developed country (e.g., Canada and the USA). 
Each of these steps include generation and use of knowledge, economic transactions, and non-
economic knowledge networking. Understanding these knowledge transfers, economic 
transactions, and institutional structures that facilitate each phase in this thesis would benefit the 
streamlined development of technologies and production of PDVs in Canada and the USA, thus 
potentially overcoming institutional hurdles to a widespread diffusion of the technology. The 
next step in realization would be extending the above understandings to developing countries 
where it is anticipated that PDVs will be adopted. 
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Building on the above work, this thesis is a first-known research compilation that analyzes the 
institutional structures and transactional forms in order to streamline development of 
technologies and production of PDVs in two industrialized countries: Canada and the USA. 
A detailed analysis and discussion of the regulatory environment for potential PDVs presented 
could serve as an important resource for academic, government, and industry discourse. A 
discussion of the social aspects of vaccines and GM crops with implications for PDVs makes this 
portion of the thesis uniquely interdisciplinary. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents a review of the science and technology behind the development of PDVs, 
including the historical background, current developments, leading technology developments, 
and new concepts. Later, a review of the Canadian institutions involved in vaccine innovation 
and adoption is conducted, including examining public, private, and public—private 
partnerships, and drawing on specific examples from the PDV world. Vaccine introduction and 
adoption models in developing and underdeveloped countries with implications for PDVs are 
outlined in section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Science and Technology Involvement in PDVs  
With the PDV research concept having been proven, and with promising products having been 
created, a 2008 publication [12] presented the advantages of the PDV platform over conventional 
vaccines, and the challenges of introduction of PDVs to complement current vaccine 
manufacturing shortages. It was concluded that the remaining scientific and technological 
challenges being surmountable, the successful strategy for PDVs would have to rely on 
continued public support as an investment in the public good. It was also suggested that the 
move beyond the proof of concept would prepare the groundwork for the expeditious licensing 
of a pioneer PDV and would catalyze the prerequisite paradigm shift. 
 
2.1.1 Historical Background 
Originally, Drs. Guy Cardineau and Roy Curtiss III at  Washington University in St. Louis, MO, 
developed the priority setting IP for oral immunization by transgenic plants, and, on 1 June 1995 
[43], filed one of the first US patent applications[43] [personal communication, Dr. Cardineau, 
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11 September 2008]. Partly financed by a small start-up agricultural biotech company, Dr. 
Cardineau and Curtiss collaboratively developed oral delivery vaccines by transforming tobacco 
leaves to express the SpaA (surface protein antigen A) gene from Streptococcus mutans. A 
consortium of researchers, including Drs. Cardineau and Curtiss, from the Biodesign Institute at 
Arizona State University (ASU) had been working with Dow AgroSciences on a project to 
develop a plant-based gene expression technology to produce proteins that would serve as 
antigens in vaccines. Later, in 2006, a poultry vaccine against Newcastle disease virus (NDV) 
was successfully demonstrated to be safe and effective, and thereafter was approved by the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) [44]. The vaccine was developed at the Animal Health Unit 
of Dow AgroSciences in collaboration with researchers from Washington University, the Boyce 
Thompson Institute for Plant Research, and Benchmark Biolabs, Inc. [44]. This was the world’s 
first PDV to get approval for commercial sale. By obtaining approval for the first PDV, Dow 
AgroSciences demonstrated that this new technology fits within the existing USDA Center for 
Veterinary Biologics regulatory approval process [12]. 
 
2.1.2 Current Developments 
Initially, PDVs were developed to be taken orally (e.g., US patent 5,686,079 [43]) in order to 
avoid expensive cold chains and to be easier and safer than injection. As risk of tolerance 
induction in humans became pronounced [7], and in an effort to conform to strict pharmaceutical 
regulations, researchers later added processing techniques (e.g., freeze-drying) and measured 
dosage to their downstream processes and delivery SOPs. 
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Since 2000’s PDV expression systems have included stable transgenic or transplastomic plants 
or plant cell lines, with inducible or constitutive expression, seed specific expression, and plant 
virus-based and Agrobacterium tumefaciens–based transient expression systems [16]. Based on 
the principal reasoning that PDVs stimulate the immune response at the mucosal level, 
researchers have been targeting diseases that infect through the mucosal system, including 
tuberculosis, pneumonia, influenza, diarrheal diseases, sexually transmitted diseases, and HIV, in 
the hope that PDVs could be especially effective against them [12]. Antigens from a variety of 
sources, including viral (e.g., HBsAg, HIV), bacterial, enteric pathogens (e.g., Enterotoxigenic E. 
coli heat labile toxin B), non-enteric pathogens, and self-antigens (e.g., immunocontraceptives) 
have been expressed in plants. 
 
In terms of production economics, the magic number for protein yield is often estimated as 1% 
of the total soluble protein; however, this is seldom reached [14]. 
 
2.1.3 Leading Technological Innovations 
Some leading innovations in PDVs have been reviewed [14, 16, 45]. Types of plants and plant 
tissues used for the production of protein and other vaccine antigens include the following: leaf 
and stem tissues of tobaccos of various species and varieties, Arabidopsis thaliana, alfalfa, 
spinach and potatoes; aquatic weeds such as Lemna spp. (duckweed); seeds of rice, beans, maize 
and tobacco; fruits like tomatoes and strawberries; root vegetables like carrots; single-cell 
cultures of the algae Chlorella and Chlamydomonas; suspension cell cultures of tobacco and 
other plants; hairy root cultures derived from various plants via Agrobacterium rhizogenes 
transformation; and transformed chloroplasts of a variety of plant species [14]. 
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Whereas classical transgenesis or nuclear transformation for expression have been historically 
prominent in PDV R&D, transplastomic and especially transformed chloroplast expression have 
also been in the limelight for some time. Chloroplast/plastid transformation technology has been 
suggested to be useful in terms of combating bio-terrorism, as seen from the high yields 
obtained, for example, of E. coli LT-B, Cholera vibrio CT-B antigens, Clostridium tetanii toxin 
Fragment C, and Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) protective antigen (PA) [16].  
 
Although constitutive or “green leaf” expression is the easiest to engineer, problems have been 
reported of proteins interfering with plant development and creating difficulties in protein 
purification. Biolex Therapeutics claims that, under good  manufacturing practice (GMP) 
conditions, their “LEX SystemSM,” a simple commercial whole plant transgenic expression 
system using the common duckweed, Lemna, allows rapid product development due to ease of 
regeneration and rapid growth  [14]. 
 
A comparison of different kinds of production platforms for biological products (proteins) is 
presented in Table 2.1. Compared to whole-plant systems, transgenic single cell cultures offer 
the advantages of a high level of containment, but lower yields [14]. Additionally, transgenic 
single cell cultures provide the possibility of producing proteins in bioreactors under GMP 
conditions, as is currently the case with conventional fermentation or cell culture techniques 
[14]. 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
System 
Complexity 
 
 
Production 
System 
Properties/Benefits (Increasing Importance from Left to Right) 
Overall 
Cost 
Production 
Timescale 
Contamination 
Risks 
Scaleup 
Capacity 
Product 
Quality 
Glycosylation 
Bacteria Low Short Endotoxins High Low None 
 
Yeast Medium Medium Low risk High Medium Incorrect 
 
Non 
Transgenic 
Plant cell 
culture 
Medium Medium Low risk Medium High 
Minor 
differences 
Mammalian 
cell culture 
High Long 
Viruses, prions 
and oncogenic 
DNA 
Very low Very high Correct 
Transgenic 
Plants Very low Long Low risk Very high High 
Minor 
differences 
Animals High Very long 
Viruses, prions 
and oncogenic 
DNA 
Low Very high Correct 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Different Biological (Protein) Production Platforms (from [45]).  
The table illustrates a comparison of different platforms sorted by benefits (columns) and system 
complexity (rows). While our ranking places, for example, “overall cost” benefit ahead of 
“contamination risks,” some researchers may use an alternative ranking according to their 
purpose. 
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2.1.4 New Concepts 
In transient expression systems, recombinant virus or other means are used to infect whole plants 
or plant cells to induce expression of foreign proteins. Thus the concept is offering the possibility 
of high level of expression of heterologous recombinant proteins in a relatively short time (due to 
the high copy number of plant viruses) [14, 44]. A combination of VLP-based (introduced in 
1.1.2) antigen presentation and transient expression for production has been indicated as the 
driver of a rapid and low-cost vaccine production system at Medicago Inc. (more details in 
subsection 4.3.1 IP Protection). In addition, novel adjuvants and delivery systems are also being 
developed to complement the emerging vaccines [44]. 
 
2.2 Institutions Engaged in Vaccine Innovation and Adoption  
This subsection outlines the various institutions involved in vaccine innovation, introduction, and 
adoption in Canada. These institutions are most likely to get involved in PDV innovation and the 
anticipated adoption in Canada. The institutions engaged in vaccine innovation and adoption are 
best approached by referring to Picciotto’s model in Figure 1.4, where A represents the public or 
state sector, C, the market sector, and E, the voluntary sector. The following discussion will 
mainly focus on the Canadian innovation scenario, with parallels drawn from the USA and 
Europe whenever possible and necessary. Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) have 
reviewed the organizations involved in vaccine innovation and adoption [46] in Canada and their 
review is presented in the paragraphs further below.   
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To better understand the role of institutions involved in vaccine innovation and adoption, the 
concept of push and pull forces shaping vaccine innovation is appropriate. In the context of 
vaccine innovation and introduction, push forces are principally composed of scientific and 
technological advances, management, and coordination support, and the availability of research 
and product development funding [59]. Conversely, pull forces are represented by  governments 
and the public sector recognizing and making commitments to the fulfillment of public health 
needs and the potential profitability of a future product within a specific market segment [59]. As 
these mechanisms are synergistically coupled, investment in either and/or both has positive 
effects on the entire vaccine innovation process. In the vaccine industry, the push forces, namely 
technology, management, and funds are integrated by company operations to target either 
existing or emerging markets. For publicly funded vaccine research, discrete mandates of 
numerous independent entities add a layer of complexity in achieving objectives 
[59].Technology, research and product development funds, and management constitute the push 
factors; management and procurement funds availability, control priorities and health systems 
capacity, and advocacy constitute the pull factors. Some of these forces are explained below (see 
also Figure 2.1a from [59]). 
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Figure 2.1a: Push and Pull Forces in Vaccine Innovation (from [59]). The arrows inside the 
cones represent the movement along the Push and Pull continuum. Black boxes represent 
potential vaccine candidates that will eventually yield one licensed product. 
 
Technology push: Several publicly funded research funding entities—including the US National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the US Medical Research 
Council, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the WHO Initiative for 
Vaccine Research, the United Nations’ Children’s Fund (UNICEF)/ United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)/World Bank/WHO Special Programme for Research and 
Training in Tropical Diseases, the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health, and the 
International Vaccine Institute—are actively involved in the technology push. These networks 
build on their collective research capabilities to fight challenges in infectious disease–endemic 
countries [59]. 
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The Pharma-Planta Project [110], a consortium of 39 principal scientists from academic and 
industrial institutions in Europe and South Africa, was funded by the European Commission in 
the area of “Plant platforms for immunotherapeutic biomolecule production.” Pharma-Planta was 
formed to build a plant-based production platform for pharmaceuticals in Europe and to enter the 
first candidate pharmaceuticals into human clinical trials. Their programme is anticipated to 
develop robust risk-assessment and risk-management practices based on health and 
environmental impact, and would work with EU regulatory authorities such as EMEA and 
European Food Safety Authority to ensure safety and acceptance. Members of the Pharma-Planta 
consortium recognized the need to develop scientific knowledge and products to specifically 
address the health needs of the poor in developing countries, and they have signed on to a 
Statement of Intent that promises to make the work from the program freely available for the 
achievement of humanitarian purposes [86]. For some results of this project, see section 5.3.1. 
 
Research and product development funds push: Increased contributions from developed 
countries to developing countries have attempted to compensate for the insufficient public 
spending on research and product development in public health tools and vaccines in developing 
countries. These contributions have been in the form of funding from bilateral development 
agencies, including the following: state aid agencies, including USAID, the Canadian 
International Development Agency, the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development, and the Swedish International Development Agency; multilateral organizations, 
including WHO, the UNDP, the World Bank, and the European Commission; and public and 
private foundations and grant support programs, including NIH, the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Wellcome Trust, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation [59]. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
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foundation (Global Health Program) supports accelerating the introduction of new and underused 
vaccines [44], including PDV research [111]. The European Commission’s five year funding of 
Pharma-Planta as part of the Sixth Framework Programme is an example of a push factor in PDV 
innovation. GAVI Alliance has both pull (below) and push force mechanisms. GAVI Alliance is 
a PPP created in 2000 to save children’s lives and protect people’s health by increasing access to 
immunization in poor countries [112]. Its partners include national governments, UNICEF, 
WHO, the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the vaccine industry, research and 
technical health institutions, and civil society organizations. GAVI Alliance’s public financing 
commitments are obtained from governments and the European Commission. Private financing 
adding to its start-up grant is obtained from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. As a push 
force, GAVI resources are used to research the prospects of accelerating the development and 
introduction of vaccines against two diseases, rotavirus and pneumococcus [112]. These diseases 
are responsible for significant mortality in developing countries. GAVI pneumo-AMC is a result 
of donations from countries and a private philanthropic foundation subsidizing vaccine 
development and production (for details, see 2.3). The push mechanism of research and product 
development funds available for vaccine candidates to combat infectious diseases in a global 
context with a focus on affordability perfectly fits PDV objectives. 
 
Management push: Good management of time and resources is important for the success of 
vaccine innovation and introduction. As discussed above, many of the international initiatives, 
public–private partnerships, and alliances created are active in vaccine research and product 
development. Some of these, including the Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation, the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and Program for Appropriate Technology in Health's 
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Malaria Vaccine Initiative, have been created specifically to manage product development 
processes and are focused on single diseases  [59].   
 
Market and procurement funds availability pull: Capital expenditure barriers resulting from 
the need to produce vaccines in accordance with good manufacturing practices have led to 
current practices of publicly funded vaccine research and product development to partner with 
least one industrial partner, or, at a minimum, one established manufacturing entity [59]. Factors 
that have an impact on the minimum level of pull forces necessary for attracting significant 
funding from an industrial partner are independent of the jurisdiction (developing vs. established 
market economy) where the products will be introduced; the factors include developmental and 
commercialization costs and risks, which result in the risk-adjusted chance of generating 
acceptable stakeholder return from a finite budget [59]. A potential solution to this dilemma is 
public sector increases in procurement commitments and funding; this approach has been 
observed to be successful in attracting commercial entities to invest in the development and 
production of the relatively low-cost HBV [59]. As vaccines are losing their reputation for being 
low-profit, high-risk biological products, and in light of large pharmaceutical companies losing 
profits to competition from generics, drying product pipelines, and increased regulation and 
costs, private companies are now turning to strengthen their vaccine candidate pipelines [9].  
 
Control priorities and health systems capacity pull: Public sector entities, such as 
international organizations and disease control programs, providing national governments with 
sufficient information about disease burden and the cost-effectiveness of new vaccines, will 
allow national governments to include evidence-based decisions about the introduction of new 
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vaccines in their immunization programs; this clearly presents a pull factor to stimulate vaccine 
research and product development [59]. Some WHO programs are considered to be a part of this 
pull force, as illustrated below. 
 
Malaria vaccines are the most cost-effective interventions to reduce the enormous burden of 
disease in the poorest countries of the world. For commercial development, the industry initially 
was not willing to commit resources because of perceived minimal market return. In order to 
assemble an adequately resourced public sector effort, in 1999 the WHO coordinated a meeting 
of international group of experts, including scientists, representatives from industry, and some 
major funding agencies. The meeting was funded by WHO’s Tropical Disease Research (TDR) 
and by Training and Roll Back Malaria (RBM), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the 
US NIH (NIAID and the Fogarty International Center). The purpose of the consortium (pull) was 
to develop safe and effective transmission-blocking vaccine candidates to the point of “proof of 
principle” to induce industrial commitment to vaccine production [113].  
  
PREVENT, an incorporated Canadian non-profit organization located in Saskatoon, is driving 
control priorities and health systems capacity pull. PREVENT conducts pre-clinical and clinical 
trials for promising early stage vaccine candidates, fast tracking critical mid-stage vaccine 
development for diseases of major concern to public health, and reducing the risk factor for 
investors and potential receptor companies [114]. Policy implications of PREVENT are 
discussed in section 5.2.1. 
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GAVI Alliance provides time-limited funding (usually over five years) for the supply of vaccines 
and other forms of support to strengthen health systems and immunization services in countries 
where GAVI Alliance programs are implemented [112]. This is done in order to save children’s 
lives and protect people’s health by increasing access to immunization in poor countries. 
 
Advocacy pull: It has been observed that evidence-based advocacy can have a great impact on 
attracting the attention of researchers and funding bodies for vaccine development projects [59]. 
The AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition (AVAC) provides an example of an international non-
profit organization that uses education, policy analysis, advocacy, and community mobilization 
to accelerate the ethical development and eventual global delivery of AIDS vaccines. MSF, 
Oxfam (for details, refer to subsection 2.3) and Universities Allied for Essential Medicines have 
advocated globally for access to affordable vaccines in developing and underdeveloped 
countries. 
  
In conclusion, a balance of synergistically coupled push and pull factors is important for a 
sustainable PDV vaccine pipeline. Commitments and collaboration are required from the 
governments, voluntary sector, and private companies for the expeditious introduction of high-
priority life-saving vaccines. 
 
2.2.1 Institutions 
It is to be acknowledged that BIOTECanada’s Vaccine Industry Committee (VIC) has become a 
voice of the Canadian vaccine industry. It is equally important to indicate that some important 
information in the following sections primarily obtained from VIC’s publicly available research 
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paper [47], may be biased and/or strongly favoured towards representing the interests of the 
industry. 
 
The vaccine introduction process is illustrated in Figure 2.1 (from [47]). This section attempts to 
map the institutional structures involved in vaccine R&D, innovation, introduction, and 
regulation in Canada. In Canada, as in most developed countries, the following initiatives have to 
be taken for successful incorporation of a new vaccine into a national immunization program 
[47]: establishing medical need, and demonstrating safety and efficacy (or immunogenicity) in 
clinical trials; obtaining marketing authorization (regulatory approval) for commercial launch; 
developing national recommendations for optimal use; securing funding to support vaccine 
program delivery; and providing necessary infrastructure for vaccine program implementation. 
These initiatives should be executed via the following processes: ensuring adequate vaccine 
supply and distribution capacity; assuring education of (and acceptance by) the public and 
medical community; establishing an appropriate infrastructure for vaccine distribution and 
delivery; and monitoring vaccine use, safety and effectiveness through post‐market studies. 
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Figure 2.1: Vaccine Introduction Process into the Canadian National Immunization Program (From 
[47]). The blocks on the left represent the steps involved in vaccine introduction and the ellipses on the 
right represent the corresponding institutions involved in the step. Subsection 2.2, especially subsection 
“National Immunization Program” outlines details about the institutions involved in vaccine innovation, 
introduction, and regulation. The acronyms are as follows: BGTD, Biologics and Genetic Therapies 
Directorate; CIC, Canadian Immunization Committee; CIRID, Centre for Immunization and Respiratory 
Infectious Diseases; CROs, Clinical Research Organizations; F/P/T Governments, 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Governments; NACI, National Advisory Committee on Immunization; 
PEWG, Professional Education Working Group; PHAC, Public Health Agency of Canada; PWGSC, 
Public Works and Government Services Canada; VIC, Vaccine Industry Committee; VSEWG, Vaccines 
Safety Expert Working Group and VSWG, Vaccine Supply Working Group. 
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2.2.2 Public Institutions 
Many federal government departments, publicly funded research institutions, and universities are 
involved in vaccine innovation and adoption in Canada, and some have even contributed to 
various R&D projects involving plants as a platform technology [46]. This subsection has been 
divided into research and development, and regulatory based on the duties and services public 
institutions provide.  
 
Research and Development: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) was involved with the 
Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) in expression and processing of influenza and 
encephalitis vaccines in plant cells [12]. Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), 
DND, performs research and develops technology for national security that includes research on 
and acquisition of vaccines against organisms that could be used in biological warfare. Their 
vaccine-related research priorities include novel platforms for rapid post-exposure immunization 
and broad spectrum vaccines. DRDC is also responsible for advanced development, support for 
Canadian licensure, and acquisition of initial stockpile of vaccines. 
 
The Centre for Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases (CIRID) of the Public Health 
Agency of Canada (PHAC) collaborates with the provinces and territories, other federal 
departments, and other entities to prevent, reduce, or eliminate vaccine-preventable and 
infectious respiratory diseases; reduce the negative impact of respiratory infections; and maintain 
public and professional confidence in immunization programs. PHAC National Microbiology 
Laboratory performs reference microbiology and surveillance, provides support to epidemiology 
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programs, and conducts applied and discovery research, including research for vaccines against 
pathogenic viruses and bacteria. 
 
National Research Council (NRC) of Canada’s vaccine research priorities include adjuvants, 
immunomodulation, and vaccine delivery; glyco-vaccine strategies for childhood diseases; and 
vaccine strategies for intracellular pathogens. The NRC Institute for Biological Sciences is 
engaged in research focused on infectious diseases, cancer vaccines, immunotherapeutics, and 
neurodegenerative diseases. About 60% of the research is directed towards discovery of new 
vaccine strategies. 
 
Vaccines and Infectious Diseases Organization (VIDO), located on the University of 
Saskatchewan campus, is a vaccine-research organization that operates with support from the 
governments of Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Government of Canada, foundations, and 
industry competitive grants. VIDO, the Canadian Center for Vaccinology (a partnership among 
Dalhousie University, the IWK Health Centre, and Capital Health) in Halifax and the UBC 
Centre for Disease Control have a history of collaborative R&D and testing of vaccines, such as 
the SARS Accelerated Vaccine Initiative and the maternal immunization against pertussis 
project. These institutions are the R&D partners of the Pan-Provincial Vaccine Enterprise 
(PREVENT, see section 2.2.4). 
 
Basic vaccine research in Canada is funded by major research funding agencies, including the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC), the NRC Industrial Research Assistance Program of Canada (IRAP), the Canada 
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Foundation for Innovation, the National Cancer Institute of Canada, and the Canadian HIV 
Vaccine Initiative (CHVI). CHVI is a collaborative undertaking between the Government of 
Canada and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation [47]. 
 
Regulatory: Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is a federal government agency 
reporting to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food (AAFC). CFIA delivers inspection and 
quarantine programs related to foods, plants and animals which include supporting vaccine 
research and animal vaccination, which prevents the spread of disease to humans. CFIA is 
involved in regulation of novel biotechnology products, including those based on plants. CFIA’s 
Plant Biotechnology Office is responsible for environmental release of plants with novel traits 
(PNT) intended for plant molecular farming (PMF) [12]. CFIA regulates these products for 
confined and unconfined environmental release under the Seeds Act and the Seeds Regulations 
(Part V), and safety assessment for use of by-products as feed is carried out under the Feeds Act 
and Regulations. The US equivalent in this case for the oversight would be the USDA Center for 
Veterinary Biologics. 
 
The Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) of Health Canada is responsible for regulating 
PDVs under the Food and Drug Act and is usually involved during clinical trials and pre- and 
post-marketing of biological products [12]. Vaccines are regulated as a subset of drugs known as 
biologics (i.e., derived or prepared from living organisms), and the Biologics and Genetic 
Therapies Directorate (BGTD) within HPFB reviews and approves all vaccines authorized for 
sale in Canada. Health Canada also supervises all aspects of vaccine production by 
manufacturers to ensure safety, sterility, and quality of large-scale batches or “lots” [47]. The US 
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equivalent for federal oversight would be the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and in 
the EU, the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). The National Immunization Program 
illustrates the introduction of new vaccines in Canada and is discussed below. 
 
It has been noted at public conferences that PDVs have been produced and clinically tested under 
the US investigational new drug application (IND), and all applicable regulatory and GMP 
requirements are in place for this type of product [48].  
 
National Immunization Program: An introduction of new vaccines into the Canadian 
national immunization program has been reviewed [47] and illustrated in Figure 2.1 (from 
[47]). Regulation and oversight of the vaccine industry is done by Health Canada as the 
federal regulatory authority, and the PHAC as the lead body in overseeing immunization 
evaluation and recommendation processes. Although official vaccine recommendations are 
made at the national level, decisions regarding the integration of new vaccines into 
publicly funded immunization programs are primarily a provincial/territorial responsibility 
carried out by Provincial/Territorial Immunization Committees. CIRID oversees the 
relevant expert groups that guide immunization procedures within the existing PHAC 
structure. These expert groups, including the National Advisory Committee on 
Immunization (NACI) and the Canadian Immunization Committee (CIC), collectively 
known as the Public Health Network, report to the Federal/Provincial/Territorial (F/P/T) 
Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health. A new vaccine is subject to the scrutiny of 
NACI after being approved by the BGTD. NACI is the national expert body that uses 
evidence-based methods to assess whether the vaccine should be used, and it provides 
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scientific recommendations for vaccine use in Canada to target groups that will most 
benefit from inoculation. All of NACI’s recommendations are publicly available. CIC, a 
relatively newer committee, is comprised of vaccine program representatives from the 
F/P/T ministries of health. The vaccine industry group, BIOTECanada VIC’s viewpoint on 
the vaccine introduction process is below. 
 
“…For the past five years particularly, federal funding has played a key role in 
financing vaccine programs in Canada, notable through the Canadian 
Immunization Trust Fund…  
…Administered by Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) 
and overseen by the VSWG subgroup of the CIC, most of the vaccines used in 
publicly funded immunization programs are purchased through a bulk purchasing 
program. (According to BIOTECanada VIC) vaccine purchases must follow an 
open, fair, and transparent procedure - respecting Canada's obligations under 
applicable national and international trade agreements …” [47] 
  
It is argued by BIOTECanada VIC that the potential overlap between BGTD and NACI 
review procedures in introducing new vaccines in Canada, and the involvement of several 
duplicative procedures in the current recommendation process (BGTD, NACI, and CIC) for 
public vaccine programs in Canada can potentially contribute to delays in access to 
innovative vaccine products by patients [47]. Correspondingly, the industry’s need for faster 
and more transparent vaccine approval in Canada has been identified in a CIHR survey [46]. 
The survey revealed that the cause of this problem might be partly due to under-funding of 
regulatory groups, and in response, it has recommended a better working engagement of the 
industry representatives with the scientists and clinicians of public health regulators. The 
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federal/provincial responsibility divide in vaccine recommendation, planning, funding, and 
delivery programs has also been identified by BIOTECanada VIC to be straining scarce 
human and financial resources within Canada’s immunization infrastructure [47]. 
 
The federal government also oversees both passive and active national vaccine surveillance 
systems. The Canadian Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance System 
(CAEFISS), a passive surveillance system that collects reports from health care providers on 
adverse events following immunization, is coordinated and supported by PHAC. The 
Immunization Monitoring Program ACTive (IMPACT) is an active surveillance system for 
documenting adverse events following immunization through 12 pediatric hospitals across 
the country. The BGTD and PHAC/CIRID have authority to decide upon the best course of 
action for resolution if unexpected or increased side effects due to vaccines occur within the 
IMPACT system. 
 
2.2.3 Private Companies 
The market sector (C in Figure 1.4) is entirely represented by the vaccine industry. 
BIOTECanada consists of representatives from small- and medium-sized biotechnology 
enterprises and core multinational companies, including vaccine developers and producers [46]. 
VIC is a subcommittee of BIOTECanada consisting of industry representatives who have a focus 
to create a vaccine environment conducive to the goals of public health and manufacturers [46]. 
The large vaccine companies, namely GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Inc., Merck & Co., Inc., Sanofi 
Pasteur, Novartis, and Wyeth Canada (acquired by Pfizer Inc.), have dominated vaccine R&D 
and manufacture in Canada. Medicago Inc., a Canadian SME in the forefront of PDV innovation, 
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is a subject case study of this thesis (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1). The private vaccine research 
community consists of the discovery and clinical research departments of the lead (first and 
second tier) industry players mentioned above, including several other SMEs [47]. Sanofi 
Pasteur has a large-scale vaccine manufacturing facility (known as the Connaught Campus) 
based in Toronto, and GSK has vaccine production facilities in Québec City and Laval, Québec; 
these facilities supply vaccines for global clinical trials and/or commercial sales (e.g., for 
influenza and acellular pertussis vaccines, by GSK and Sanofi Pasteur, respectively) [47]. 
 
2.2.4 Public–Private Partnerships 
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are an arrangement of transaction (area B in Figure 1.4) 
between the public goods producing state and the market, a compromise between public good 
and private property ownership. From a development and public policy perspective, the 
following are the drivers of PPPs [49].  
 
As the state pursues policies to maximize the interests of society altogether, governments or 
organizations look to collaborate with one or more partner(s) who share their particular 
objectives, e.g., poverty reduction. Once the partners have agreed on partnership objectives, the 
type of governance most suitable to the partnership must be examined. The governance structure 
provides a framework within which the partners can make strategic decisions (in relation to the 
partnership objectives), organizational decisions (regarding the use of financial and non-financial 
resources), and operational decisions (regarding the delivery of the partnership’s outputs) [49]. A 
written, but incomplete, agreement should then be made between the partners to recognize the 
importance of agreeing on ways to manage the partnership, such as IP and revenue management, 
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and conflict resolution. Written agreements between partners are considered incomplete because 
it is not possible to write agreements that predict all possible actions and events [49]. A 
partnership can thus be considered a joint effort towards common public policy objective(s), by 
means of shared governance based on incomplete written agreement [49]. 
 
In 1989, the federal government established the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) to 
enhance partnerships between university and industry researchers. The NCE program is 
supported and directed by the CIHR, NSERC, and the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC), and is in partnership with Industry Canada [50]. An integral part of 
Canada’s Innovation Strategy, NCE networks are large-scale, academically led virtual research 
networks that bring together partners from academia, industry, government and not-for-profit 
organizations [51] to turn Canadian research and entrepreneurial talent into economic and social 
benefits for all Canadians. This type of relationship is in contrast to corporate partnerships, 
which are primarily profit-oriented. Building on the success of the original NCE program that 
funds research, the Centres of Excellence for Commercialization and Research (CECR) program 
supports the operating expenses of a centre, and the commercialization of such research [52].  
 
PREVENT, one of the CECRs, is working with public health experts, the vaccine industry, and 
the investment community to move promising vaccines against diseases of major public health 
concern to the stage where they can be licensed to an industry partner for late-stage clinical trials 
and commercialization. PREVENT’s institutional role in vaccine innovation pull has been 
highlighted in 2.2. The federally funded Genome Canada program, launched in 2000, and its 
projects, involves an array of PPP that were expected to contribute to pushing Canada into a 
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position as one of the world’s most innovative countries by 2010 [53]. One of the objectives of 
the Genome Canada/Genome Prairie project entitled “Functional pathogenomics of mucosal 
immunity” was to determine the influence of vaccines and other agents on host gene expression 
in order to provide new information about the processes of disease and innate immunity to 
microbial pathogens. 
 
R&D and testing efforts of the cytomegalovirus (HCMV) subunit vaccine in plant and plant parts 
involved a consortium from the University of Ottawa, Health Canada, the Canadian Red Cross 
Society, AAFC, Prairie Plant Systems Inc. and others [12]. This consortium shows a working 
example of a traditional model of state–private sector PPP (Health Canada, AAFC, and Prairie 
Plant Systems) working with public universities and NGOs (area D in Figure 1.4). 
 
2.3 Vaccine Introduction and Adoption Models 
Vaccines have been deployed in developing countries to combat infectious diseases. Cost 
effectiveness, safety, technology transfer, and scalability of PDV technology make it very 
attractive to be rapidly introduced and adopted in developing countries. Access and affordability, 
on the other hand, hinder the application of many currently available medicines in developing 
country environments [81]. Below is a selection of ways in which vaccines can be made 
accessible and affordable to developing and underdeveloped countries. Some of these models are 
applicable to PDVs.  
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Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) was the first attempt in making Canadian drugs 
(including vaccines) accessible and affordable to developing countries, and it is documented 
here. In the late 1990s, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF/Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam, and 
other NGOs commenced a public awareness campaign in which they identified patents as a 
principal barrier to access to medicines in developing and under-developed countries. Members 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) who met in Doha in November 2001 unanimously 
recognized patents as being an important obstacle for developing countries wanting to access 
essential medicines. In 2003, the WTO adopted a “historic agreement” intended to permit 
developed countries to export generic versions of patented medications to developing countries. 
Responding to pressures from Canadian civil organizations and Stephen Lewis, the UN Special 
Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa,  in September 2003, Canada became the first country to 
announce that it would amend its patent law to authorize the export of generic versions of 
patented medicines to developing countries. In May 2004, the Parliament of Canada 
unanimously adopted Bill C-9, known as the [Prime Minister] Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa 
Act. The bill was unanimously supported by NGOs, pharmaceutical companies, and producers of 
generic medicines [82]. Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D) continues 
to support the principles behind CAMR. In addition, preferential and non-profit pricing have 
been key initiatives used by Rx&D member companies to increase access to medicines in 
developing countries [83]. Study of CAMR is important, from a historical perspective, to learn 
about the success and failures (discussed in detail below) of an industrialized country specific 
model (and framework), created by federal legislation to make medicine (and vaccines) 
affordable for the developing and underdeveloped countries. 
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A different form of the access to medicines principles is proposed by a hypothetical case study 
done in 2009 by Castle et al. [42] for a PDV against Hepatitis B in India through a diffusion 
model case study. It was concluded that producing a PDV in the United States that is then 
distribution by an Indian firm in India is expected to yield the fastest time of distribution, and 
thus the greatest health benefits. It was also suggested that institutional hurdles to a widespread 
diffusion of the technology still need to be overcome. The members of the scientific community 
engaged in PDV activity recognize that in order for public sector groups to accomplish their 
public good objectives, they should use humanitarian licensing practices [15]. A process of two-
tier licensing is suggested, whereby developed nations would pay regular price for vaccines. On 
the other hand, the license to developing nations would be arranged in a way such that ensures 
their poor population get access to these vaccines at a much reduced affordable price.  
 
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation Alliance’s (GAVI) Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC) is a financing model that subsidises pharmaceutical companies for the 
development and production of new vaccines intended specifically for developing countries. The 
subsidy is only paid once a vaccine meeting certain specifications is made available at a given 
price set by the AMC donors. For pneumococcal vaccine AMC (pneumo-AMC; to prevent 
pneumococcal infections by Streptococcus pneumoniae), a candidate must meet WHO pre-
qualifications and be available at US$7 (2010 US$ values) per dose price. Contributors of the 
US$1.5 billion pneumo-AMC are Italy (US$635 million), the UK (US$485 million), Canada 
(US$200 million), Russia (US$80 million), and Norway and the Gates Foundation (US$50 
million each) [84]. The signing of supply agreements for pneumococcal vaccines within 
pneumo-AMC by Pneumo-AMC, and GSK and Pfizer has been criticized by MSF for price 
49 
 
affordability barriers, limited production and access (poorest countries only), and access 
contingent on registration in individual jurisdictions [85]. It is indicated that at a cost of US$21 
per child (three doses at US$7 per dose), donors and GAVI will be spending much more money 
for a vaccine than the existing vaccines in developing countries [85]. Comparatively, UNICEF 
paid US$2.80 for DPT–H influenza vaccine and US$0.62 for HBV (2005 figures) [86]. Pneumo-
AMC suggests a potential long-term cap price of US$3.5 for pneumococcal vaccines in 
developing countries [76].  
 
A model for two-tiered pricing exists. As part of GAVI pneumo-AMC, GSK will charge 
governments in poor African countries US$7 per dose of Synflorix pneumococcal vaccine for 
use in public sector clinics, starting in December 2010 [87]. Europeans pay around €40 (US$54) 
per dose for the same vaccine. This launch was controversial as MSF made a public report of 
GSK promoting its Synflorix pneumococcal vaccine to Ugandans willing to pay US$50 per dose 
from their own finances [87]. GSK made a statement afterwards that it would reduce its prices in 
Uganda, acknowledging MSF had pointed out that a violation of GSK’s tiered pricing policy. 
 
Though viewed as a paradigm shift, CAMR has been largely been ineffective [88] in delivering 
its goals. It has been argued that delivery of CAMR policy has been a near total failure [89]. The 
law has only been used once and the Canadian company Apotex involved in the process found 
the separate negotiations for approval so burdensome that it promised never to use it again. 
Apotex’s experiences and challenges operating within the framework of CAMR have been 
documented [88]. Recent parliamentary procedures aimed at amending CAMR have been 
reviewed [89, 90].   
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In a follow up to their position from late 1990s, in 2010 MSF and Oxfam warned that high prices 
and the currently acute funding crisis (at least primarily for GAVI; see section 2.2) would 
hamper the global approach to ensure access to life-saving vaccines for children in the poorest 
countries [91]. It was indicated that although the competition to achieve price reductions has 
been very effective for expanded program on immunization vaccines, the same has not yet been 
realised for the newest vaccines [92]. Prior experiences with tiered pricing, particularly for new 
vaccines, have been mixed and have not yet led to sustainable prices, either in low- or middle-
income countries [92]. It is recognized the current market-based R&D system failed to address 
the need for improved, cheaper, and more suitable versions of existing vaccines [92]. Additional 
efforts to analyze, prevent, or remove patent barriers have been recognized to be necessary, 
including using open licensing policies on the parts of universities and government research 
bodies, and exercising the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) flexibilities when appropriate. To ensure vaccines meet the needs of 
developing countries in terms of presentations and serotypes, it has been suggested WHO 
prequalification and other mechanisms be used. It is remarked that only a handful of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies continue to produce the newest vaccines, whose 
oligopoly status allows them to charge high prices [91]. Despite GAVI’s global role and 
negotiating power, the newest vaccines are inaccessible to the poorest countries due to high 
prices.  
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The TRIPS Agreement is an integral part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
[93]. The TRIPS Agreement makes it mandatory for countries to ensure that patent protection is 
available in all fields of technology, for both process and product inventions. The global 
introduction of the TRIPS standards is expected to delay the marketing of generic versions of 
new drugs, and, thus, the competition they entail [93]. It is anticipated by WHO that prices of 
newer drugs will remain high for a longer time due to TRIPS, which will result in reduced access 
for many people, notably in developing countries [93], thus seriously restricting access to 
medicines.  
 
Recently, public health groups, humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations, experts, and 
academics that work on access to medicines gathered at the University of California at Berkeley 
on 15 July 2010, to issue the Berkeley Declaration on Intellectual Property Enforcement and 
Access to Medicines [94]. They identified that recent worldwide “intellectual property 
enforcement” initiatives threaten access to affordable medicines in poorer countries, and declared 
that responsible enforcement initiatives must not interfere with access to medicines and should 
be grounded in human rights principles; protect innovation, competition, and consumer rights; be 
negotiated through a transparent, inclusive, and open process that does not bypass existing 
multilateral institutions; and protect the full use of TRIPS flexibilities that promote access to 
medicines. 
 
It has been suggested that, to achieve increased access to medicines, advantage be taken of 
TRIPS safeguards in terms of: (i) compulsory licensing, (ii) parallel importation, and (iii) 
provisions for early working [93]. The compulsory license safeguard is of special interest in the 
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context of this discourse. This is a license to use an invention that has been granted without the 
permission of the patent holder [93]. This license can be used to allow the production and sale of 
generic products before the expiry of the patent, thus increasing opportunities for competition, 
and eventually driving prices down. A special case of this licensing is “government use” (or a 
compulsory license for public non-commercial use) where TRIPS imposes less stringent 
conditions. However, it is indicated that the safeguards provided for in TRIPS can only be used 
when incorporated in national law [93]. Therefore, it is important that the compulsory license be 
included in public health policy and national legislation to protect the public interest and public 
health. Many countries, including many developed countries, have provisions for compulsory 
licenses in their national laws. The federal Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in 
India is currently investigating the option of introducing compulsory licensing under the (Indian) 
Patents Acts to address the concerns about the availability of low-cost life-saving drugs [95]. 
 
Another working example of access to medicines is illustrated by the Developing Countries 
Vaccine Manufacturers’ Network (DCVMN), established in 2001. DCVMN is a voluntary public 
health–driven alliance of vaccine manufacturers owned by and located in developing countries 
that offer a consistent and sustainable supply of affordable and accessible quality vaccines [96]. 
In the beginning, DCVMN’s main strategic priority was to increase access to vaccines for HepB 
and Hib containing the diphtheria pertusis tetanus (DPT) combination. It was hoped at that time 
that GAVI would support DCVMN by push mechanisms, such as facilitating access to 
technology as DCVMN’s priorities were in line with objectives of GAVI. However, the expected 
support from GAVI Alliance at that time did not happen, partly due to international concerns for 
unfair subsidizing certain individual manufacturers. Some of the factors that secured support for 
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DCVMN are the transfer of conjugation technology from the Netherlands Vaccine Institute 
(NVI), the ability of the ‘‘receiving’’ DCVMN members to invest upfront in this conjugation 
technology, and their ability to absorb the transferred technology. Due to these support factors, 
the main strategic priority of DCVMN has nearly been reached at a global scale [96]. 
 
Serum Institute of India Ltd. (SIIL), a part of DCVM, recently acquired licenses for an 
indigenous monovalent Hib and for pentavalent (DTP—Hep B—Hib) vaccines [96]. SIIL 
obtained the NVI Hib process technology from the Netherlands Vaccine Institute. It is expected 
that SIIL will get the necessary clearance to supply vaccine to UN organizations, with a 
production capacity of over 100 million doses. It is anticipated that this imminent availability of 
additional Hib vaccine products will reduce the global vaccine price in the next few years. 
 
One of the novel ways of making vaccines accessible and affordable to poor countries is 
illustrated by the Meningitis Vaccine Project (MVP), a collaboration among the WHO, the US 
non-profit PATH, and SIIL [92]. MVP was created in June 2001 through a grant from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation [92]. MVP has given funding, expertise, and technology (a push 
mechanism) to SIIL for the development of a monovalent meningococcal A conjugate vaccine 
(against group A Neisseria meningitidis) for use in African countries [97]. In exchange, SIIL has 
committed to charge a maximum price of US$0.50 on the final product. MVP has generated a 
meningitis vaccine to be available by the end of 2010, which will cost no more than US $0.50 
per dose [92]. This vaccine is tailored to the needs of countries in the so-called “Meningitis Belt” 
in sub-Saharan Africa. MVP has also been urged by MSF and Oxfam to change the current 
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system so that donor funds incentivize the development of adapted vaccines and ensure 
affordable prices. 
 
The meningococcal A (Mn A) polysaccharide (PS)–tetanus toxoid (TT) conjugate vaccine 
(above) was developed using reductive amination of polysaccharide aldehydes and toxoid 
hydrazides [23]. There are three steps involved in the preparation of the Mn A PS–TT conjugate: 
activation of TT, activation of Mn A PS, and conjugation of activated Mn A PS to activated TT 
[23]. Mn A PS is microbial based, and TT is made from broth cultures of Clostridium tetani 
(bacterial) [98]. As illustrated in Tables 1.2 and 2.1, additional savings can potentially be made 
in the Mn A conjugate vaccine if the components Mn A PS and TT were produced in plants. 
  
It is well recognized that patents can increase the cost of product development, by increasing 
transaction costs and delaying access to research inputs, due to fragmented IP owned by multiple 
parties (known as anticommons) [80]. This makes investments targeting the needs of small or 
unprofitable markets (e.g., combating infectious diseases in developing and underdeveloped 
countries) difficult for private companies to justify economically, although not on moral or 
humanitarian grounds. Creation of anticommons in the USA has been credited to the Bayh–Dole 
Act, which established incentives for universities to develop independent technology transfer 
programs and manage IP in a highly individualized and even competitive framework, with 
respect to other universities. As outlined above (section 2.3), when IP that is developed with 
public funding is licensed exclusively to private companies, as has been in extensive practice 
since the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act by US Congress, the technology is typically unavailable 
to support product development for low income/margin markets (e.g., prophylactic vaccines). To 
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address this issue, a range of patenting and licensing strategies that explicitly define and reserve 
rights for humanitarian uses of patented technologies to allow product development for non-
commercial markets have been developed [80], as discussed below.  
 
In agriculture, publicly minded licensing is a concept illustrated by the Public Intellectual 
Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) in response to concerns about IP impediments to 
research and development in subsistence crops for the developing world. The agriculture public 
licensing model is important to study because of its implications on PDVs, which encompasses 
the fields of life sciences and agriculture. In this model, a mechanism has been created by PIPRA 
for its members to collaboratively manage their agricultural IP with goals that focus on both 
individual universities’ interests as well as public good. Elements from the PIPRA IP model 
could be applied when impediments arise in PDV access to developing and underdeveloped 
country markets. 
 
Another approach to address anticommons is Biological Innovation for Open Society (BiOS), 
which is modeled on the open source paradigm in software. BiOS provides access to platforms of 
patented enabling technologies through an “open source” license that protects the BiOS 
technologies from private appropriation, and it builds a “commons” of IP through a grant-back 
provision [80]. Grant-back is a term included in a licensing agreement that provides the licensee 
to disclose and transfer all improvements made during the licensing period. This provision 
expands the initial technology pool and prevents the development of blocking patents on 
improvements. Publicly funded universities have also joined the effort to ensure global access to 
medicines/vaccines. In 2007, the University of British Columbia (UBC) adopted Global Access 
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License Principles in an effort to ensure that UBC’s biotechnology and environmental licensees 
develop and market UBC-derived technologies for global benefit [99]. Under this framework, 
UBC has licensed a low-cost oral formulation of Amphotericin B (novel agent against 
leishmaniasis) to iCo Therapeutics. According to the licence agreement, iCo Therapeutics agreed 
to produce and sell at-cost versions of the drug (against leishmaniasis) in developing countries, 
in return for rights to market the drug for the treatment of blood-borne fungal infections in the 
developed world [99]. Elements from BiOS and the UBC Global Access License Principles IP 
model could be applied when impediments arise in PDV access to developing and 
underdeveloped country markets. The issue of access to medicines in Canada and its implications 
for the future of publicly funded Medicare program have been discussed in [61, 100], (with 
supporting evidence [102] and bulk purchase of medicine plans [101]). 
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3. METHODS, THEORY, AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Traditionally, life science research has been isolated, following the “standing on the shoulders of 
giants” model where individual efforts build upon knowledge generated by others, with little 
formal or informal exchange of information during the discovery phase [20]. The explosion of 
life science research since the 1980s and fragmented IP has resulted in increased collaboration 
and networking.  
 
The literature review consists of three parts: first, a discussion about the development of models 
to describe the innovation process is documented. Evolution of innovation models from the 
simplistic linear to chain-linked networked models are illustrated with figures. Second, the 
economics of exchanges or transaction are discussed, drawing on both neo-classical economics 
and new institutional economics. Third, non-economic dimensions of networked knowledge are 
presented. 
 
3.1 Innovation Process 
The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate® Dictionary, Eleventh Edition (online version) [54] defines 
innovation as: 
1 : the introduction of something new, and 
2 : a new idea, method, or device. 
Many scholars have discussed the innovation process and developed its schematic representation, 
with two models having evolved from this. Presented below is a discussion of each of the sets of 
models, based on conceptual development, and not necessarily in chronological order, as 
relevant to the thesis. Rothwell [55] reviews the chronological evolution of innovation models: 
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technology push (first generation), market pull (second generation), coupling (third generation), 
integrated innovation (or integration and parallel development) (fourth generation), and system 
integration and networking (fifth generation). The push and pull models have been elaborated on 
in section 2.2. 
 
3.1.1 Linear Models 
Since World War II, a linear model has been used, wherein R&D leads to production and is 
ultimately marketed [56]. This simplistic model is shown in Figure 3.1 below. Rogers [57] 
represents innovation development as a linear process consisting of six stages: problem 
definition, research (basic and applied), development, commercialization, adoption and diffusion, 
and consequences.  
 
Figure 3.1: Linear Model of Innovation (Adapted from [56]). This is one of the simplistic linear 
models of innovation. 
 
Historically, the linear model of innovation positions post-secondary institutions of higher 
education at the earliest stage of knowledge creation and focuses on university research as the 
generator of ideas [58]. Feldman and Stewart [58] studied technology transfer mechanisms from 
academic institutions to the industry. They discussed a framework for considering the evolving 
role of institutions of post-secondary education in generating economic growth and development. 
Figure 3.2 shows both formal and informal knowledge transfer mechanisms from an academic 
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institution. Traditionally, emphasis has been put on formal knowledge transfers and market 
transactions, as these can be measured and evaluated, e.g., publication of papers, reports, patents, 
etc. Informal knowledge exchanges facilitate intellectual discourse leading to novel ideas, 
creativity, and exploration, and is within the domain of networked knowledge, as discussed in 
section 3.2.1. Further elaboration on types of knowledge is presented in section 3.1.3. Figure 3.3 
(from [58]) represents the linear transfer of formal knowledge from academics to the industry, 
and identifies stages and stakeholders involved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms from Academic Institutions (From [58]).  
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Figure 3.3: Linear Technology Transfer from Academic Institutions to Industry (From [58]). 
The boxes represent knowledge flow from scientific discovery (creation), to patent protection, to 
licensing (transaction) and tangible benefits such as income, jobs, and wealth creation. Inputs to 
knowledge creation and transfer have been illustrated. 
 
3.1.2 Non-Linear Models 
Progression of an idea through an innovation process is explained to be due to two synergestic  
mechanisms: push and pull. Whereas a visible demand is a pull factor for the vaccine candidate  
in the marketplace, technical and operationally feasibility is considered a push [59]. These 
mechanisms and their relation to vaccine innovation have been elaborated in section 2.2. The 
current theories on innovation, including technology push, market pull, and an organizational 
approach have been criticized for their lack of integration and inapplicability to the 21st century 
competitive environment [60]. 
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Many success/failure studies done during the 1970s of innovation performance suggested that the 
coupling model (with its feedback loops and market linkages, and with the addition of limited 
functional overlap) more often led to success than did its linear predecessors [55]. Kline and 
Rosenberg [56] present their model of innovation as a non-linear, dynamic, chain-linked process 
to represent the relationship among the elements of research, invention, innovation, and 
production. Their dynamic model is illustrated in Figure 3.4a.  It consists of feedback loops 
between each stage to the previous one, with the potential of an innovator to seek out existing 
knowledge, or to undertake or commission research to solve problems in the innovation process 
[20].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4a: An Adaptation of Kline and Rosenberg’s Chain-Linked Model of Innovation (From 
[20]). Arrows represent the flow of knowledge. 
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Rothwell’s integrated representation of innovation can be depicted as a process of know how 
accumulation, or the learning process, involves elements of internal and external learning, 
composed of interacting and interdependent stages [55] (see Figure 3.4b). The element of 
internal learning involves the following processes: learning by developing; learning by testing; 
learning by making–production; learning by failing; learning by using in vertically integrated 
companies; and cross-project learning. External or joint internal/external learning involves the 
following: learning from/with suppliers; learning from/with lead users; learning through 
horizontal partnerships; learning from/with the S&T infrastructure; learning from the literature; 
learning from competitors’ actions; learning through reverse engineering; learning from 
acquisitions or new personnel; learning through customer-based prototype trials; and learning 
through servicing/fault finding. The internal and external learning stages interact and are 
dependent on each other as represented by the arrows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4b: Innovation as a Process of Know-How Accumulation (From [55]). Innovation is represented as a 
process of know-how accumulation, or learning process, involving elements of internal (P1, P2, etc.) and external 
learning, composed of interacting and interdependent stages. Arrows indicate flow of knowledge. See main text for 
details. 
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Traditionally, biotechnology innovation has been viewed it in terms of sequential stages of 
product development over an expansive and long period. One of these later models is shown in 
Figure 3.5. The figure shows five different stages in product and availability: basic research, 
innovation and invention, early-stage technology development, product development, and 
production and marketing. The unique features of the model are, first, that it outlines various 
important activities in its life cycle, and second, that it directly refers to at least two critical 
functions—R&D and funding, and financing—and indirectly indicating a third one, the use of 
collaborations to keep companies funded and active in research [60]. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Sequential Model of Innovation (From [60]). 
 
Khilji et al. [60] presents a sequential model of innovation (Figure 3.6), a conceptual framework 
for applying the integrated innovation model to biotechnology firms. They make the case for 
incorporating market-oriented mechanisms, building and using appropriate organizational 
capabilities, developing effective collaborations, and creating parallel interactions as major 
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elements in a general strategy toward the success and improved efficiency of biotechnology 
companies. This model builds on models developed with the integrated approach by previous 
researchers, including Rothwell [55] (as discussed in section 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Integrated Biotechnology Innovation Model [60].The dotted line represents the 
distinction between pre-invention and post-invention stages. Regulatory approvals are required 
both before and after clinical trials to grant or withdraw approved drug status. 
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3.1.3 Nature of Knowledge 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate® Dictionary, Eleventh Edition (online version) defines 
knowledge as: 
2 a (1) : the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained through experience 
or association (2) : acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art, or technique b (1) : the 
fact or condition of being aware of something; and 4 a : the sum of what is known : the body of 
truth, information, and principles acquired by humankind.  
 
In a knowledge-based economy (KBE), knowledge can be classified into four distinct kinds for 
the purpose of economic analysis, and have been described in detail by the OECD [62]. These 
are: know-why, know-what, know-how and know-who knowledge. Characteristics of the kinds 
of knowledge have been reviewed [20]. Whereas know-what and know-why are suggested to 
closely fit the marketable commodities category of knowledge with economic valuation tools, 
know-how and know-who forms represent the tacit form of knowledge that are more difficult to 
codify and measure. A detailed description of the kinds of knowledge is presented in Table 3.1 
(from [20]). The understanding of knowledge types and their associated details helps to frame 
the analysis in phases of development in section 4.3. 
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Table 3.1: Classification of Types of Knowledge (From [20]). 
Knowledge 
Type 
Degree of 
codification 
Produced by Extent of disclosure 
Know-why 
Completely 
codified 
Universities and public 
laboratories 
Fully disclosed and 
published in scientific 
journals 
Know-what 
Completely 
codified 
Universities, public 
laboratories and private 
companies 
Fully disclosed in 
patents 
Know-how Not codified 
Hands-on experiments in 
laboratories 
Tacit; limited 
dispersion 
Know-who Not codified 
Exists within companies or 
research communities 
Tacit; limited to 
community 
 
3.1.4 Life Cycle of Knowledge  
The “life cycle of knowledge” model developed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey [40] is central to 
our socio-economic analysis of PDV innovation and adoption process. The model (Figure 3.7) 
illustrates the time course of innovation, in terms of resource (money) inputs or benefits 
(revenues, represented as $ in the amplitude). The model illustrates four distinct (but at times 
overlapping) phases/stages of development. A detailed explanation of the significance of the 
different phases and associated amplitudes is provided in section 4.3 (Chapter 4). 
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Figure 3.7: The Life Cycle of Knowledge Valuation (From [20]). 
 
The phases of development are the following: first, the research phase that involves setting up 
and undertaking research; second, the gestation phase that involves proof of concept, patent and 
IP protection applications, and other pre-market commercialization investments; third, the 
adoption phase that could involve an incremental investment for IP management and product 
maintenance; and fourth, the knowledge stock, in which the various kinds of knowledge 
generated are used as inputs to further research. 
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3.2 Economics of Transactions 
Transactions (a.k.a. deals) are common where exchange of different kinds of knowledge takes 
place. Transaction cost theories applicable to innovation processes have been reviewed [20, 63]. 
It is suggested that the control variable of analysis is the transaction, and that the two approaches 
to mitigate the potential cost of opportunistic behaviour in a buyer–seller relationship (e.g., 
between a research-intensive and a manufacturing company) are contractual relationships and 
vertical integration. According to transaction cost economics, the ultimate objective for both 
parties in a relationship is to minimize transaction costs [49]. Partnership is suggested to be one 
of the mechanisms to reach that objective, as detailed in section 3.3 and illustrated with a 
business case study in 4.3.1 subsection Transactional Forms and Institutional Structures > 
Characteristics. 
 
3.2.1 Economic Definition of a Transaction  
A transaction is said to occur when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface [20], e.g., when a research institution licenses their invention to a 
manufacturing/marketing company for manufacture and distribution. Nobel laureate economist 
Amartya Sen argues that the standard economic models put a lot of focus on exchange, mainly of 
commodities, as opposed to exchange of speech, claims, proposals, and settlement [64]. 
 
Transactions can be characterized by their structure and dimensions, and involve three cost 
components, relating to search, negotiation, and enforcement. For example, the research institute 
and manufacturing company (above) would incur costs for searching, negotiating, and enforcing 
the license, although different amounts for either parties. Three principal dimensions in which 
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transactions may differ from one another, with respect to their relative costs are the following: 
first, transaction uncertainty may vary, depending on the extent of communication or strategic 
behaviour; second, the frequency of a transaction, i.e., occasional or recurring, can influence 
costs; and third, asset specificity arises when the opportunity cost of a particular transaction is 
much lower in its best alternative use; thus, when the original transaction is terminated, the asset 
has reduced value. 
 
Agency theory provides a complementary explanation for the transaction costs [20]. The theory 
assumes that firms (“principals”) contract with “agents” to avoid market risk inherent in arms-
length market transactions. An agency dilemma occurs when a principal is unable to adequately 
monitor or assess an agent’s behaviour, i.e., when the agent’s task is less programmable, when 
accomplishing the task entails risks, or when the goals of the principal and agent are in conflict 
[65]. Task programmability is the contribution of inputs by the agents to the task. Non-
separability is the contribution to the total output. These terms will be used frequently in the 
analysis later. 
 
Mahoney [41] provides a synthesis of agency theory and asset specificity to explain the various 
institutional structures and agreements that might emerge to manage different types of 
transactions, as described in Table 3.2. These transactions cover a spectrum from simple, arms-
length spot markets to fully vertically integrated operations, with a number of non-market 
relationships (e.g., hierarchy, clan, or cluster communities with established norms) to deal with 
network-generated knowledge. 
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Table 3.2: Transaction Forms in Different Situations (adapted from [20]). 
Situations 
Low Task Programmability High Task Programmability 
Low asset-
specificity 
High asset-
specificity 
Low asset-
specificity 
High asset-
specificity 
Low Non-
Separability 
Spot market 
Long-term 
contract 
Spot market Joint venture 
High Non-
Separability 
Relational 
contract 
Clan (hierarchy) Inside contract Hierarchy 
 
3.2.2 Institutional Structures  
Discussion of the institutional structures that govern the generation and use of knowledge is 
integral to the analysis of introduction and adoption of new biotechnology products. There are 
three main kinds of institutional structures [20] that participate in the innovation process and 
deliver marketable products and/or services: public, market (private), and the voluntary sectors. 
The kinds of pure goods delivered by these institutions are public, market, and common pool 
goods. These structures are represented in the Picciotto model in Figure 1.4.  
 
In Figure 1.4, the public or state sector A represents the citizens of a country and pursues policies 
to maximize the interests of society altogether, producing public goods; the market sector C 
owns property and attempts to maximize profits on those investments by producing private 
market goods; and the voluntary sector/civil society groups E consists of those that join a project 
to reap the benefits of collective action and to pursue goals that cannot otherwise be 
accomplished through individual action (e.g., common pool goods). The public sector is 
optimally suited for creating public good and know-why scientific knowledge, and uses a social 
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welfare evaluation framework for decision making. In contrast, private firms use valuation 
models derived from accountancy to optimize the net present value of investments in technology 
development. Collective organizations are ideally suited to deliver know-how and know-who 
knowledge.  
 
In Figure 1.4, the intersecting areas labelled B, D, F, and G represent institutions that operate 
between and within the overlapping dominant areas of the public, market, and voluntary sectors 
(public organizations, NGOs, and hybrid corporations, respectively) and are suggested to be a 
domain of networked knowledge [20]. These overlapping institutions have been reviewed in 
detail [21]. The overlap between government and private goods B are considered to be toll 
goods, within the scope of public (e.g., SaskWater—water and waste water services in the 
province of Saskatchewan) or regulated private corporations and can be in the form of public 
utilities. The overlap between private and common pool goods D are civil goods. Institutions in 
this category are NGOs, e.g., public advocacy/interest groups, professional standards, and civic 
action. The overlap between common pool and government goods F are public goods. This 
domain consists of hybrid organizations that are responsible for issues like rural roads. The 
original Picciotto model fails to explain the profile of institutional structures operating in the 
center of the framework where all the spheres overlap G [21]. Smyth [21] provides an insight 
into potential importance and constitution of this area from a regulatory governance perspective. 
It is suggested [21] that G is of great importance to PDVs (and plant-made pharmaceuticals 
collectively) as a third generation plant biotechnology product, where there is a regulatory 
vacuum due to much advanced science currently compared to established regulation. The 
regulatory pathway is still not clear and the federal government is investigating policy options 
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for commercial production of PDVs [66]. Public institutions involved in regulatory oversight of 
PDVs consist of CFIA and Health Canada (see section 2.2.2 subsection Regulatory). It is argued 
that the regulatory management of PDVs in the area G could be a shared function effectively 
done by government regulatory agencies, the private industry associations, and the judicial 
system. 
 
Areas A and C in Figure 1.4 would represent the operations of federal government agencies 
(such as the CFIA) and the biotechnology industry (e.g., BIOTECanada), respectively, for 
regulation of novel biotechnology products. In the case of a dispute between A and C, the area of 
overlap is under the jurisdiction of civil courts. However, most cases referred to the Supreme 
Court of Canada is on social policy, over which the court does not have jurisdiction [21]. This 
situation is within the scope of the Auditor General of Canada. The structure of interaction of 
CFIA and the biotechnology industry in Canada does not allow public participation. The 
interaction between A and E is usually in the form of Royal Commissions, specially structured 
government committees and government organized public forums, e.g., Canadian Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee (CBAC). The interaction of C and E is twofold: first, through civil courts in 
the case that the public, as consumers, is not satisfied with industry-established quality assurance 
policies (illustrated with biotechnology business cases in section 1.2.3). Second, the emerging 
role of media in assuming the role of industry watchdog has been emphasized [21]. Both 
mainstream media and new media cooperatives, in online and print format, can assume this role. 
One example of new media cooperative in Canada would be the Media Co-op.  The Media Co-
op is a network of member-supported, local democratic news organizations across Canada that 
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has been publishing since May 2003 [http://www.mediacoop.ca/info/about] The Media Co-op 
publishes the Dominion, with locals in Halifax, Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis: Partnerships as Enabling Mechanism 
Innovation in life sciences has been argued to resemble a non-linear, chain-linked “networked” 
structure [20], as also discussed in section 3.1.2. In the Canadian context, most networked 
research has been precipitated and partially supported by government departments and agencies 
[20]. Some examples are the Genome Canada program partially supported by Industry Canada, 
and the Networks of Centers of Excellence (NCE) program administered by the Research 
Councils (NSERC, SSHRC and CIHR) in partnership with Industry Canada. Phillips and 
Khachatourians have presented a detailed study of one such networked structure involved in the 
transformation of the canola industry by biotechnology [67]. The Abiotic Stress Project, a 
Genome Canada project, has been analyzed within the framework of innovation models, 
transaction economics, and networking mechanisms [20]. 
 
The primary objective of the thesis is to explore whether SME partnership would be a good 
business model for the introduction and adoption of PDVs. It is hypothesized that SME 
partnership as a business model might work for introduction and adoption of PDVs. In the kind 
of business model under investigation, a research-intensive privately or publicly traded 
biotechnology SME usually forms PPP in research networks and strategic partnerships with large 
pharmaceutical/biotechnology companies for manufacture and/or distribution. The hypothesis is 
tested in Chapter 4. 
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Trends indicate that research-oriented biotechnology SMEs have emerged as significant players 
in the development of new vaccine and biopharmaceutical candidates [63]. This trend continues 
as traditional large-scale in-house research in large pharmaceutical companies is no longer the 
predominant mode in the industry [63]. Research programs (see section 4.3) in biotechnology 
SMEs tend to exhibit high non-separability; i.e., it is difficult to determine the output of an 
individual. Literature therefore suggests monitoring output is one of the most important features 
of R&D intensive biotechnology SMEs. Subsequently, it is important to develop a good 
mechanism to adequately reward hard and productive work [63]. 
 
The final product of SME biotechnology companies is usually the creation of scientific 
innovation [63], which serves as input for large pharmaceutical companies that produce and 
market the final product (e.g., vaccines) to customers [63]. These entities (biotechnology SMEs 
and large pharmaceutical companies) have a buyer–seller relationship. To mitigate the potential 
cost of opportunistic behaviour between the entities, either a contractual (collaborative) 
relationship or vertical integration might be a good fit [63]. Patent hold-up is reported to be a 
challenge in the highly R&D-intensive biotechnology industry [63]. Because monitoring is 
critical, vertical integration may not be a desirable solution to hold-up problems [63]. Thus, 
according to transaction cost theory, a feasible alternative is to form strategic alliances 
(partnerships) [63]. 
 
A key hypothesis of transaction cost economics (section 3.2) is that partners choose a 
governance structure that minimizes transaction costs [49]. This means transaction costs could be 
reduced by choosing appropriate partners and governance structures. It is shown later in 4.3.1 
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(subsection Transactional Forms and Institutional Structures > Characteristics) how a PDV SME 
reduced transaction costs by choosing appropriate partners and governance structures.  
 
Pros and cons of partnership in achieving organizational objectives for private companies have 
been reviewed [68]. It has been suggested that the complexity of a joint project, difficulties in 
relinquishing control, and a lack of trust between the parties are barriers to a successful 
collaboration [63]. It is also suggested that successful partnerships view their relationship not as 
a transaction between two companies, but as a transformation that enables them to work together 
in an entirely new mode [68]. The thesis indicates that some objectives that SME biotechnology 
companies strive for  (and that give them a competitive advantage) occur by partnering with 
other SMEs and/or large companies. Among these objectives are access to product pipeline 
and/or IP; R&D [63]; access to distribution network; access to production facilities; access to 
financial resources (alliance capital) [63]; and expanding markets. For a detailed discussion on 
examples of these objectives, see section 4.2. 
 
It has been indicated that partnerships and strategic alliances have a strong effect on success of 
SME life science businesses. Researchers with Deloitte Services/Deloitte Consulting/Deloitte & 
Touche surveying the biotechnology industry found that, although the importance of partnering 
has long been recognized, developing and maintaining effective cross-sector partnerships is not 
yet common practice [68]. Small life science companies, for example in Vancouver, B.C., have 
become very successful through strategic partnerships with major international firms [69].  
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4.  ANALYSIS AND MODELLING  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analysis of two separate business case studies, each of which are 
attempting to commercialize a PDV. The analyses will illustrate each phase of development 
within the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3. In sections that follow, the generation 
and use of knowledge, the agreements secured to administer, and the institutional structures that 
facilitate each phase are presented from the two studied business case studies.    
 
4.2  Analysis of Two Business Case Studies 
Two institutional situations are illustrated and analyzed: 
• Business case study A: A publicly traded biotechnology company, Medicago Inc., based 
in Eastern Canada that is commercializing PDVs (see Table 4.1); and 
• Business case study B: An academic institution based in the USA collaborating with an 
American agricultural biotechnology Dow AgroSciences limited liability company (LLC) 
to commercialize PDVs (see Table 4.1). Dow AgroSciences is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of a publicly traded corporation, The Dow Chemical Company. 
 
The literature indicates that most biotechnology companies strategically work to develop a PDV 
platform technology and vaccine candidates/products that are just spinoffs from these platform 
technologies. This argument is further supported by Andrew Sheldon’s (CEO, Medicago) 
interview with the Globe and Mail in 2008: “If the influenza vaccine proves successful, 
Medicago intends to apply the tobacco-harvesting technology to make vaccines for everything 
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from malaria to HIV” [70]. Oftentimes, the choice of these vaccine candidates are market driven, 
e.g., Medicago’s influenza vaccine candidates. The companies place special value on these 
platform technologies (usually IP protected as a suite/family of patents) as their IP assets, which 
they use as a tool to raise public and/or private capital of different forms (venture capital, IPO, 
etc.). Drawing on the discussion of economics of transaction from section 3.2 (Chapter 3), it was 
highlighted that transactions are common where exchange of different kinds of knowledge takes 
place. It is relevant to note that transactions occur when capital is raised by a company, as there 
are knowledge exchanges between the company and the community of investors.  
 
4.2.1 Business Case Study A 
The priority IP was developed by collaboration between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
Sainte-Foy (in Québec City, Québec), a Canadian federal government department (public lab), 
the Canadian Red Cross Society (a non-profit, humanitarian organization), and Université Laval 
(a public university located in Québec City). The IP was subsequently licensed to Medicago Inc., 
a company that was founded in 1997 [71] and incorporated in 1999. Since establishment, 
Medicago has received significant public investment. This public investment includes funding 
from National Research Council IRAP [http://www.nrc-
cnrc.gc.ca/eng/news/nrc/2010/08/25/medicargo-irap.html] and CIHR 
[http://www.medicago.com/English/news/News-Releases/News-
ReleaseDetails/2010/300000CanadianInstitutesofHealthResearchgrantawardedtoMedicagoMcGil
lUniversityandtheResearchInstituteoftheMcGillUniversityHea/default.aspx] for basic 
immunological research and product development. Medicago went public in 2006 and is being 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
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Initially, Medicago focused on genetically engineered alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) lines to 
produce recombinant proteins for human, veterinary, and industrial applications [71]. Proficia™ 
is Medicago’s platform technology. In 2006, Medicago made a dramatic shift in business 
emphasis by focusing on the influenza vaccine market, and for this purpose, switching from 
alfalfa plants (to generate drugs and proteins) to tobacco as the manufacturing medium [70]. The 
latter platform scores better in production speed (four weeks) compared to alfalfa (eight months), 
which is crucial for developing seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine production. This 
change in business emphasis was purely a result of projected market pull due to an increasing 
fear of influenza pandemic in 2006, and boosted by rising government funding into influenza 
vaccine research. Indication of national pandemic preparedness plans positively influencing 
business growths in vaccine development found in this thesis has also been documented by 
authors in the past [72]. 
 
Dr. Louis-Philippe Vézina and François Arcand co-founded Medicago. Dr. Vézina obtained his 
Ph.D. in plant biochemistry at Université Laval and worked as a research scientist in the GE 
group of a large alfalfa project at Soils and Crops Research and Development Centre (AAFC) in 
Sainte-Foy [71]. Mr. Arcand was former CEO (1997–2002) of Medicago and is the current CEO 
of ERA Biotech [73]. He has an executive MBA from John Molson School of Business, 
Concordia University, Montréal. 
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The competitive advantages of Medicago are, first, manufacturing advantages of transient 
expression in plants (speed and cost), and second, the VLP advantage as an antigen (breadth of 
the immune reaction, cross-reactivity, and one-dose product) [74]. Currently, the market supply 
for inactivated seasonal influenza vaccines is produced twice yearly in embryonated chicken 
eggs. It takes six months after the identification of influenza strains by WHO international 
surveillance system to begin production [18]. In April 2009, Novavax, a small biopharmaceutical 
company located in Rockville, MD, produced a VLP vaccine candidate for the H1N1 strain [9] 
in insect cell culture and recombinant baculovirus cultures [19]. Medicago successfully 
expressed a H1 VLP antigen, a vaccine candidate against the new strain of influenza A (H1N1), 
within 14 days of receiving the genetic sequence of the new virus [75], much faster than 
expression in embryonated chicken eggs, and insect cell- or recombinant-baculovirus culture.  
 
Compared to other vaccine production platforms, egg-based manufacturing systems suffer from 
limited capacity, poor flexibility, and restricted responsiveness, decreasing the effectiveness of 
this system in a pandemic [17]. It is thus clear why alternative systems (e.g., PDVs) to 
complement supply are contemplated. 
 
4.2.2 Business Case Study B 
The idea to invent oral immunization by transgenic plants has been reviewed in section 2.1.1. 
The project to develop a plant-based gene expression technology to produce antigens for 
vaccines was a collaborative effort of researchers involving Drs. Cardineau and Curtiss, from 
Biodesign Institute at ASU working with Dow AgroSciences.  
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In 2005, a news release1 indicated this group entered a formal two-year research and 
collaboration agreement (transaction as discussed in section 3.2) to bring forward plant-made 
technology advancements to create plant-made vaccines for the animal health industry.  
 
Later, in 2006, a Newcastle disease virus (NDV) vaccine developed at Animal Health Unit of 
Dow AgroSciences by this collaboration and others was the world’s first PDV to get approved 
for commercial sale [44]. Dow AgroSciences does not plan to commercialize the NDV vaccine 
product. As NDV is well known and understood by the regulatory agency (USDA) it served as 
an excellent model to prove Dow AgroSciences’ new plant based vaccine production technology. 
A 2006 Dow AgroSciences news release indicates that in fewer than five years, the company 
moved the science forward, established a production facility, and received this regulatory 
approval milestone [44]. Careful evaluation leads to interpreting this “moving the science 
forward” as a development since the beginning of ASU PDV platform research project, which is 
estimated to be around 2001. This estimate suggests that Dow AgroSciences had established 
some informal know-how and know-who knowledge exchange(s) with Biodesign Institute at 
ASU since at least 2001. 
 
 
 
 
1Dow AgroSciences, Biodesign Institute at Arizona State University Collaborate in Advancing Plant-Made Vaccine Platform.  
2005 [cited 12 May 2010]; Available from: http://www.dowagro.com/animalhealth/resources/news/20060131b.htm. 
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Business case study B in this analysis specifically refers to the PDV project at Dow Agro 
Sciences/Biodesign Institute at ASU. Concert™ Plant-Cell-Produced System is their platform 
technology. This business case study will be presented in this thesis whenever required to 
complement the prerequisite analysis with a US perspective.  
 
The plant-cell-produced vaccine production system developed by Dow AgroSciences is based on 
the use of a recombinant plant cell line, which could be a potato, tomato or tobacco plant cell. 
Dow AgroSciences is actively working on a pipeline of plant cell-based vaccine candidate 
products which are all at different stages of commercialization with final products anticipated 
within a decade. 
 
The general process development strategy followed by Dow AgroSciences has been 
documented1 and is described below. There are several sequential steps involved. First, the plant 
cells are transformed using conventional plant cell biology techniques to introduce the desired 
antigen. Second, a master seed is established and vaccine antigen is prepared by growing the 
cells in a conventional bioreactor. The plant cells are then grown in a defined culture medium 
comprised primarily of water, a carbohydrate source, minerals and salts. The cells are harvested  
 
1Mihaliak, C.A. and S.R. Webb. Plant-Cell-Produced Vaccine for Animal Health.  2005  [cited 6 September 2011]; Available 
from: 
http://www.dowagro.com/PublishedLiterature/dh_004d/0901b8038004d659.pdf?filepath=/PublishToInternet/InternetDOWAGR
O/animalhealth/pdfs/noreg/010-99016&fromPage=BasicSearch 
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and processed once sufficient replication occurs. Formulation is then done for the bulk antigen 
for delivery. Current process development involves this basic process followed for four different 
antigens. This strategy indicates the potential for a universal production system in which multiple 
antigens can be expressed and delivered using a single production system. 
 
In order to determine the feasibility of the plant-cell produced production system for delivering 
vaccines to the poultry and livestock industries a series of studies have been conducted. Three 
requirements have been established to demonstrate proof of concept of the vaccine. First, is a 
demonstration that the plant cells can successfully express the antigen. Second, the antigens must 
induce immunity when delivered to the target species. Finally, the vaccinated animals must be 
protected when challenged with disease. All three proof-of-concept criteria have been 
demonstrated in vaccinations and challenge studies in birds. 
 
Dow’s objective in getting this NDV approval was to demonstrate that the Concert Plant-Cell- 
Produced system is capable of producing a vaccine that is safe and effective and to demonstrate 
that it meets the requirements for approval under the rigorous USDA regulatory system.  
 
Moving forward, research will examine immunity to various virus strains and additional disease 
targets in addition to exploring mass delivery capabilities. To further develop, test and 
commercially validate the technology continued development will require leveraging the 
expertise of academic specialists, poultry and livestock industry experts. In that direction, Dow 
AgroSciences has worked closely with the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant Research, 
Arizona State University, Benchmark Biolabs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Concert Plant-Cell-Produced1 vaccines eliminate the environmental concerns associated with 
other plant-based methods because the system uses only plant cells — not the whole plant – to 
produce vaccines. The plant cells are grown in a culture medium comprised primarily of sugar, 
salt and water. Concerns about transfer of seed, pollen or plant parts into the environment is 
eliminated because no seeds are planted, no whole plants are grown, and no pollen being 
produced. Plant-cell-produced vaccines are grown in stainless steel tanks by Dow AgroSciences 
in a bio-contained facility. Additionally, these cells are non-propagative, i.e. they cannot grow 
outside the culture medium. 
 
Table 4.1 outlines a comparison of business case studies A and B in terms of parameters such as 
company size, IP, platform technology, market, location, etc. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1An Ounce of Prevention.   [cited 13 September 2011]; Available from: http://www.dow.com/news/feature/2006/05_22_06/. 
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Table 4.1: Details of Business Case Study Profiles*. 
Parameter Case Study A Case Study B 
Size ** Small Large 
IP Own Owned in fragments 
Platform technology Proficia™ Concert™ Plant-Cell-Produced System 
Platform Whole living plants (tobacco) Plant cell culture 
Stage (Year) of 
development †  
Gestation phase 
(1999) Gestation phase (2001§) 
Market Identified Identified 
Location Canada (East) United States 
Funding/Investment Public & private Public & private 
Ownership Publicly traded Private 
Manufacturing Capability Under construction (2010) Yes [7] 
Collaboration with 
Companies/Institutions Yes Yes 
  
* Business case study A = Medicago Inc., Business case study B = ASU/Dow AgroSciences LLC. 
** Definition according to Industry Canada [77]; for goods producer companies, micro is 1-4 employees, small is 5-99 
employees, medium is 100-499 employees and large is 500 + employees. 
† Analysis of knowledge/technology life cycle, see section Phases of Development. Year here refers to the year when 
the PDV project started. 
§ Estimated year, see section 4.2.2. 
 
4.3 Phases of Development 
Knowledge generation and use can be represented as phases of development over a time period. 
Comparing Alston, Norton, and Pardey’s original model [40], Peter Phillips’s adaption of Alston, 
Norton, and Pardey’s model [20], and the time scale illustration by Khilji et al. [60] provides us 
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an estimate of time period for each of the few phases, research (requires around 6.5 years), 
gestation (around 8.5 years), adoption (around 6 years), and knowledge stock (around 9 years). 
 
The estimation of phases of development over time is based purely on agricultural biotechnology 
product/knowledge life cycle [20, 40]. The thesis explores phases of development of a 
transformative innovation (PDVs) that is both in the domain of agricultural biotechnology and 
biopharmaceutical product/knowledge development. It is thus argued that there might be a 
margin of error for projecting a PDV product/knowledge life cycle based on only agricultural 
biotechnology–focused product/knowledge life cycle. 
 
Drawing on the discussion from section 3.1.4, it was shown that Figure 3.7 represents the life 
cycle of knowledge valuation, with money represented as the amplitude and time as X-axis. 
Dollars spent is represented as the negative amplitude, and dollars earned as positive. There are 
costs incurred and investments made during research (research costs), and gestation phases 
(testing/registration costs); and benefits accumulated/used during adoption (adoption benefits) 
and knowledge stock phases (knowledge stock benefits).  
 
Different stakeholders (actors) in the innovation spectrum have interest in particular 
interpretations of the phases of development [20]. Private or collective actors tend to ignore 
some or all of the costs (e.g., public goods provided as inputs to the research phase) or benefits 
(e.g., the knowledge stock phase, as discussed in section knowledge phase).  Each of the actors is 
assumed to be attempting to optimize their risk-adjusted net present value of their benefits, net of 
their costs. 
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Figure 4.1: Biopharmaceutical Product Life Cycle [60]. 
 
Considering the analysis discussed in the beginning of this section, both Medicago's Proficia™ 
technology and Dow AgroSciences’ Concert™ Plant-Cell-Produced System are currently in the 
gestation phase (see also Table 4.1). 
  
4.3.1 Research Phase 
Advancements in immunology, microbiology, genomics, and related scientific and technical 
knowledge since the 1990s have generated an explosion in vaccine R&D activities. This 
explosion has been fuelled by increased focus and investment in vaccine candidate pipelines by 
private companies. Focus has shifted away from vaccines being a low-profit, high-risk biological 
product especially in light of big pharmaceutical companies losing profits to competition from 
generic products, drying product pipelines, increased regulation and costs [9, 78]. These 
advancements have added several layers to the already complex and fragmented 
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vaccine/biological product research process, as has been documented by the proliferation of 
fragmented IP protection (discussed below in 4.3.1 subsection IP Protection) and increased 
ownership of scientific inventions.  
 
The primary challenge of any research project is identified to be developing and initiating it in 
the first place [20]. This task involves finding the appropriate teams to do the work (embodying 
the know-how and know-who) and acquiring the appropriate rights to prior art (either public 
domain knowledge, or by negotiating research and commercialization licenses to patented 
technologies). Subsequently, the main costs involved in this phase are research costs, represented 
as the negative amplitude in Figure 4.1. A break-up of that would be costs involved in 
assembling a team with appropriate research expertise, negotiating research contracts, 
negotiating appropriate rights to prior art, etc. This subsection discusses some aspects of the 
research phase namely, IP protection, developed nation focused product, cooperation and 
networking, and transactional forms and institutional structures. 
 
Intellectual Property Protection: Ideally, IP protection of novel invention serves the purpose of 
providing a financial incentive to the inventor(s) for potential commercial development of the 
invention (or idea) to benefit the society. For example, granting a patent legally excludes 
anybody and everybody from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the 
developed idea and /or product for a period of 20 years (in the USA), other than the inventor(s) 
and/or their assignees (usually sponsors and/or employers). In the USA, there has been an 
almost-tenfold increase in university involvement in the patenting and licensing of inventions 
since the Bayh–Dole Act (1980) [79]. This Act allowed institutions to own inventions resulting 
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from federally sponsored research and to exclusively license those inventions [80]. PDV 
innovation fits within many existing IP regimes and it is therefore difficult to categorize PDVs 
for the purpose of IP protection; it is a plant variety, a drug, a biotechnological innovation, and a 
developing nation-focused public health tool, all in one [81]. 
 
Developing Nation-Focused Product: The characteristics of PDVs that have made them very 
attractive for use as prophylactics in developing and underdeveloped countries are cost 
effectiveness and safety, and transferable and highly scalable technology. On the other hand, 
access and affordability hinder the application of many currently available medicines in 
developing nation environments [81]. Ways to make PDVs accessible and affordable in 
developing and underdeveloped countries is outlined in section 2.3. 
 
Cooperation and Networking: Life science and vaccine research is inherently tacit, making it 
increasingly complex and IP ownership fragmented. Researchers therefore have to constantly 
access third party IP and know-how knowledge to start and continue with own research programs 
(discussed in section 3.0 and illustrated in 4.3.1 subsection Transactional Forms and Institutional 
Structures > Characteristics, below). In order to decrease the transaction costs, collaborating and 
partnering, fostering both formal and informal relationships across the research and licensing 
community, have therefore increased, as shown in section 4.3.1. 
 
It is common knowledge that the private sector is profit driven, and it exists to make a 
competitive return on investment. Because the market for the poor countries (low- and medium-
income/LMI) does not provide this return, the private sector is not interested in investing in 
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developing vaccines for the developing and under developed countries. In recent years, 
governments and private philanthropic foundations have stepped in by funding PDV research 
initiatives to address the widely acknowledged imbalance of a lack of investment in R&D for 
health technologies for the poor [15]. This is primarily achieved through public–private 
partnerships (PPP). 
 
Previous research has identified potential advantages and disadvantages of partnership during the 
research phase [68]. Potential advantages include sharing of risk, speed and cost advantages over 
other research approaches, sharing of regulatory expertise, and facilities. Potential disadvantages 
include absence of compatible partners, and challenges in sharing proprietary control and 
managing IP. 
 
Table 4.2: Implications of Strategic Goals and Technical Factors in the Research Phase (From 
[20]). 
Factor Implications 
Strategic Goal 
• Search for, and negotiation of, a research project 
• Assembling codified, know why and know what knowledge 
• Combining this with tacit know-how and know-who 
• Creation of a new product or process 
Technical Factors • One time transactions, involving low task-programmability, 
low non-separability and high asset-specificity 
 
Using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, the types of knowledge generated and 
used, and the institutions needed to handle the transactions and relationships can be identified. 
Table 4.2 shows the implications of strategic goals and technical factors in the research phase. 
90 
 
The informal and formal knowledge exchanges and transactions occurring during the research 
phase will also be discussed with illustrative examples relating to the business case studies. 
 
Transactional Forms and Institutional Structures: This subsection analyzes the research 
agreements and institutional structures prevalent in research phase. 
 
Research Agreements: Option agreements are common agreements in the research phase. 
In this type of agreement, the licensee gets a patented technology (or multiple) from the 
licensor, for further R&D or other  non-commercial purposes, for an option period or term 
(mostly 8–12 months), for specified amount of money (option fee). The option term is 
followed by a negotiation period where the licensee has an option to negotiate a 
commercial license agreement to this technology. The execution of a license would allow 
the licensee to legally utilize the licensed technology for commercial purposes for the 
duration of the license (in years) and the licensor receives timely payment of licensee fee. 
 
In business case study A, between 1999 and 2001, Dr. Vézina had negotiated a license 
from AAFC [71], where the knowledge for protein production in transformed alfalfa 
technology was developed (see also US Patent 5,990,385 [103]). This technology was later 
refined at Medicago independent of host plant species to be called Proficia™ platform 
technology. Medicago opened its R&D laboratories and greenhouses in 1999 [71]. In 2000, 
it formed a Strategic Development Team to begin selling the rights to this technology. In 
2001, it implemented its Prototype Development Unit to service the first commercial 
agreements, and continued doing so in its Dedicated Production Units in 2002. 
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At the same time frame, BTG International, Inc. had sublicensed a pollen electro-
transformation technology to Medicago in June 1999 [104]. This technology was 
developed around in 1992 by Agricultural Research Services (ARS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and patent protected as a result of research agreements 
with BTG International. ARS and BTG scientists worked together to put the technology 
into practice for tobacco, corn, and alfalfa plants. BTG International had in-licensed the 
pollen electro-transformation technology in 1993 from ARS. It is understood that the 
electro-transformation technology served as an enabling technology for Medicago to create 
recombinant varieties of perennial forage legumes such as alfalfa and clover to produce 
pharmaceutical proteins and antibodies. 
 
The history above illustrates that IP/technology developed by AAFC, USDA-ARS, and 
others served as background knowledge/prior art to which Medicago had to gain access 
prior to starting its research phase. It has been said that in this complex age of life science 
research, no single company has full freedom to operate without negotiating access to 
someone else’s technology [20]. The formal research and license agreements discussed 
above constitute transactions as explained in section 3.2, and their characteristics are 
discussed below. 
 
Characteristics: Today, the public sector through PPP is making substantially increased 
investments in health technology innovation [15]. In the past, these institutional structures 
faced a common problem of how to manage IP. In this thesis, the framework offered by 
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Mahoney [41] issued to determine the optimal, actual and options or choices of 
institutional structure(s) that can handle the exchange of the factors that influence 
generation and use of knowledge. These are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Structuring and managing research projects are becoming very time consuming due to the 
need for both, an extensive search for the right partners and input, and the negotiation of 
the terms of exchange and common action. Full and long-term contracts would be optimal 
economically where full information is available and where there are no transaction costs. 
However, it is observed that transaction costs are premium (non-zero and high value) and 
the probability of having commercial success in any given project is relatively low. In 
present, usually less than 10% of projects return the costs of the investment. As a result, it 
is somewhere less likely that a full contract will be developed between the parties [20]. 
 
The research programs presented earlier tend to exhibit low task-programmability (i.e., 
partners cannot be told how to engage in discovery activities), high non-separability (i.e., it 
is hard to determine output of an individual) and the results have very high asset-specificity 
(i.e., the technology or product often has a very specific use).  
 
According to Mahoney’s framework, this situation of low-task programmability and high 
asset-specificity, with high non-separability (as above) represents a worst-case scenario in 
which input and output measurements of research are ineffective [41]. This situation is a 
perfect trigger for a “financing gap,” a term also called “Death Valley” by 
economists/technology-transfer professionals, where investors are reluctant to invest 
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because they are unable to measure the output of research and associated value of their 
investment. This financing gap is represented as pre-commercial gap in Figure 4.2 (taken 
from Sustainable Development Technology Canada’s (SDTC) portfolio website 
[http://www.sdtc.ca/index.php?page=about-our-funds&hl=en_CA]. Mahoney [41] suggests 
a viable solution (also see Table 3.2) to address this difficult economic dilemma is forging 
a clan or hierarchical relationships, where opportunistic attitudes are transformed in favour 
of human solidarity. In the modern sense of the word, a clan would be exemplified as a 
research cluster, e.g., the Saskatoon agricultural biotechnology cluster [20]. In business 
case study A, AAFC Sainte-Foy, Université Laval, and Medicago would be considered a 
part of the Québec City life sciences cluster (see Figure 4.3). This cluster consists of 
biopharmaceuticals, bio-diagnostic tools, medical equipment manufacturing, 
nutraceuticals, and telemedicine [105]. Medicago reduced the transaction costs and 
therefore increased its probability of commercial success (as discussed in the beginning of 
this section) by building on background knowledge from informal inter-institutional 
relationships in the research cluster (AAFC, Université Laval, etc.) Our findings are further 
supported by an economic analysis of the Saskatoon agricultural biotechnology cluster 
[20].  
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Table 4.3: Research Phase: Institutional Structure Analysis (From [20]). 
 
Institution Characteristics 
Optimal 
Institutions 
• Long term contract or hierarchical relationship 
 
Actual 
Institutions 
• Short-term, one-time contracts involving multiple partners 
operating with incompatible and/or competitive operating 
mandates creates pressures to negotiate all benefits in a 
single process 
Institutional 
Options 
• Long-term renewable contracts with more chances for 
rebalancing benefits and costs over the longer term 
• Embedding of the negotiations and contracts in networks 
or clans, such as the agricultural biotechnology cluster in 
Saskatoon 
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Figure 4.2: Financing Gaps as an Entry Barrier (Death Valley) for Introduction of New 
Technologies (From: [http://www.sdtc.ca/index.php?page=about-our-funds&hl=en_CA]. 
  
 
Figure 4.3: Location of Québec City Life Sciences Cluster [Google Maps Canada; 
http://maps.google.ca/ Retrieved on 20 May 2010]. 
Legend: The locations are circled in red; AAFC and Canadian Red Cross Society are located in Sainte-Foy. 
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To better understand how clans reduce the transaction costs, one has to consider regional 
systems of innovation or industrial clusters operating as hybrid actors in Figure 1.4 (the 
intersecting areas labelled B, D, F, and G, the domain of networked knowledge). In the 
Saskatoon cluster, informal inter-institutional relationships between public research 
institutions, a public university, and private companies enables learning from their 
collaborations, thereby adding further to the know-how knowledge and providing a visible, 
efficient point of entry for know-how and know-who. These clans are not always restricted 
to geographical proximity as illustrated in business case study B by partnership of Dow 
AgroSciences, Biodesign Institute at ASU, Washington University, Boyce Thompson 
Institute for Plant Research, and Benchmark Biolabs, Inc.  
 
4.3.2 Gestation Phase 
This phase involves taking the results of the research activities from the research phase and 
determining how to optimize their commercial and social benefits [20]. This includes the 
following: (a) proof of concept (for definition, see Appendix A); (b) newly generated 
knowledge/IP protected with appropriate mechanisms, i.e., patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade 
secrets, plant breeders’ rights released into the public domain in the form of publications and 
public repositories deposit; and (c) gaining some results of research that need approval from 
appropriate regulatory authorities for further use. The relationships between influencing factors 
and their implications on strategic goals are outlined in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Implications of Goals and Technical Factors in the Gestation Phase (From [20]). 
Factor Implications 
Strategic Goal 
• Protection of intellectual property resulting from the 
research phase 
• Achieving regulatory approval and market 
introduction 
Technical 
Factors 
• Low-frequency transactions involving high-task 
programmability, low non-separability and high asset-
specificity 
 
Costs involved in the gestation phase are highly significant. They are represented by the negative 
amplitude in Figure 3.7. Costs involved in proof of concept can vary and run into millions of 
dollars [20]. In terms of knowledge exchange, proof of concept likely involves the know-how of 
the research team to develop the methodologies and to undertake the experiments required to 
demonstrate the efficacy and scientific merit of the invention. This could simply be viewed as an 
obvious extension of the research phase [20]. In vaccine research, proof of concept involves 
successful completion of all four phases of clinical trials in human volunteers, where efficacy 
and safety of the candidate has been established (Figures 1.1 and 4.1). Data from 2007 indicate 
that the cost of patenting process, including initial drafting of the application through prosecution 
of the patent application, allowance, issuance, and post-issuance maintenance of the patent, can 
easily run from US$30,000 to US$50,000 in legal and patent-office fees [106]. The cost of 
regulatory compliance ranges from US$1.5 million for simple plant transformations, to US$75 
million for a new therapeutic pharmaceutical (where only one in ten succeeds); and initial public 
offerings (IPO) generally cost a minimum of 10% of any market offering (2005 figures) [20]. In 
2006, Medicago raised gross proceeds of $2,003,834 by IPOs on the TSX Venture Exchange 
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[81]. This figure above is helpful in making a comparison between the amount of money raised 
by Medicago IPO and the cost of patenting/regulatory compliance. 
 
Using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, the thesis identifies the types of 
knowledge generated and used, and the institutions needed to handle the transactions and 
relationships. The optimal, actual, and potential institutional structure(s) to handle the exchange 
of the factors that influence generation and use of knowledge are outlined in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: The Gestation Phase: Optimal, Actual, and Potential Institutions (From [20]). 
Institution Characteristics 
Optimal 
Institutions 
• Joint ventures 
 
Actual 
Institutions 
• Each partner institution owns IP discovered by their 
researchers and is responsible for commercializing this 
property 
• IP is highly fragmented, and often inaccessible, due to 
lack of access to tacit knowledge 
Institutional 
Options 
• New joint venture, either between projects and research 
networks, or with a commercial agent (e.g., VIDO-Pyxis 
Genomics) 
 
In order to better understand the deals and knowledge exchanges involved, a discussion of the 
paper trail leading to one of the significant exchanges in business case study A is described. In 
September 2008, PMI announced they offered to acquire 49.8 per cent of Medicago for an 
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investment of $15,975,000 [107] and acquisition of one seat on Medicago’s Board of Directors 
[70]. The paper trail is outlined below. 
 
In February 2007, Medicago made a contact with R&D executives from PMI at BioPartnering 
North America meeting in Vancouver. PMI have a good understanding of the genomics of 
tobacco, and had plans to diversify its portfolio and do something beneficial with the plant other 
than manufacture cigarettes. PMI had sent its executives to look for “adjacent technologies” for 
the tobacco plant [70]. Medicago was looking for financing to initiate human clinical 
development of their lead H5N1 influenza vaccine in 2009. At the Vancouver meeting, 
Medicago was successful in convincing PMI to invest in Medicago’s research project with their 
value proposition (higher speed, and cost-effective, highly scalable pandemic vaccine 
production). In October 2008, PMI subsidiary Phillip Morris Products (PMP) and Medicago 
entered into a joint pandemic and seasonal influenza research program. The terms of the 
agreement stipulated that Medicago will hold rights to arising IP from the program, and PMP 
will be granted a licence on such arising IP.  
 
Two weeks after the Vancouver meeting, PMI visited Medicago to verify the science, vet 
management’s credentials, and check that the facilities could handle a scale-up of production. In 
December 2007, PMI contracted Medicago to manufacture a specific (confidential/unknown) 
molecule [70]. Satisfied with the delivered results, in January 2008, PMI acquired Medicago’s 
licensed  pandemic and seasonal influenza vaccine production in tobacco platform technology. 
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In September 2008, with its $15,975,000 investment, PMI got 49.8% stake and a board seat at 
Medicago. For Medicago, the deal provided PMI’s scientists and many resources to be available 
for the research project [70]. In December 2009, Medicago reported positive results from Phase I 
clinical trials [108], which indicated the first step in proof of concept.  
 
Transactional Forms: These transactions are relatively low-frequency with high task-
programmability, low non-separability (the ability to succeed in any single step in the gestation 
period is fundamentally affected by the contributions of the entire team); and high asset-
specificity (approval at any stage is specific to the product or technology). These technical 
factors are outlined in Table 4.5. 
 
Institutional Structures: Mahoney [41] describes joint ventures as the optimal institutional 
form, with shared investments and shared equity in the results of gestation phase. Our findings 
from business case study A further confirm Mahoney’s framework, as reported above (section 
4.3.2). In this case, PMI forms a joint venture with Medicago for an influenza vaccine 
development program, with $15,975,000 investment (shared investment) for 49.8% equity 
(shared equity). In this structure, Medicago owns rights to arising IP from the joint program and 
PMP (PMI) is automatically granted a licence on such arising IP. 
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4.3.3 Adoption Phase 
As the companies we studied in our business case studies have not passed the gestation phase, 
further discussion presented would be entirely of conjecture with practical consequences. 
Continuing the discussion, ideally, proof of concept would have been achieved, by the end of 
gestation phase. IP protection of invention would have been granted, a working prototype of the 
product(s) developed, and required regulatory approvals granted. The adoption phase involves 
marketing the results of the research, i.e., achieving optimal adoption of the technology or 
product and realizing a return on that activity. 
  
Transactional Forms and Institutional Structures: Technology adoption could take several 
pathways. First, if the research project managers develop and produce their technology or 
product directly, that would involve search, negotiation and enforcement costs; if, on the other 
hand, the technology were to be sold or licensed to others, then the main cost would be related to 
enforcement [20].  
 
The theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3 suggests IP for sale and licenses would be best 
handled in the context of longer-term relationships (e.g., joint venture, long-term contract, or 
hierarchy). Almost any organizational option (e.g., from short/long term contracts, clans, 
strategic partnerships, to joint ventures, etc.) could work for direct production and sale. 
 
Findings in this thesis indicate that the second pathway seems to be what Medicago is taking. 
Between July 2009 and March 2010, Medicago had negotiated and/or signed three 
commercialization agreements with three corporate entities in five different regions. These 
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regions were France, India, the Middle East and North Africa, and Japan. The objective for using 
a Medicago technology platform to complement existing domestic influenza vaccine production 
infrastructure in these regions was to offer surge capacity of influenza vaccines before the first 
wave of a pandemic.  
 
Conditional to Medicago delivering certain results (e.g., phase I clinical trials), it was anticipated 
that some of these above-mentioned corporate entities (licensees) would get non-exclusive 
licenses to manufacture pandemic and seasonal influenza vaccine by territory (regions), and 
Medicago would in turn be able to receive revenue streams for specified sales and/or units 
manufactured. Medicago’s short term corporate strategy of building on their strengths in drug 
development for proof of concept, and then forming partnerships in manufacturing and 
marketing further substantiates the projections made in this thesis. Completion of these license 
deals would require a great amount of due diligence in terms of licensee compliance and IP 
enforcement.  
 
Here again value of partnership as an enabling mechanism is being highlighted. By negotiating 
partnership agreements with entities that have established manufacturing facilities and marketing 
networks to license out its platform technology, Medicago built on its strength of drug 
development.  By doing so, it potentially shortened the time to manufacture vaccines and reach a 
larger and wider market. Previous research to this thesis has identified potential advantages of 
partnership in manufacturing as faster than building in-house, and in marketing, potentially 
opening new channels to reach existing customers, and creating access to new customers [68]. 
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4.3.4 Knowledge Stock Phase 
The continued benefits of the generated knowledge, also known as knowledge stock phase, 
provide a basis for future research. This knowledge stock phenomenon is considered a social 
benefit of research and implicitly acknowledged in the “public good” agenda at most universities 
and public research institutions, but has not been incorporated into their IP management plans in 
any strategic way [20]. 
 
As the “patent and then publish” drive is gaining momentum at public research institutions [20], 
advantages of knowledge stock have been severely diluted. This is because once the knowledge 
generated is protected by patent, the knowledge is never considered to be released in the public 
domain, even though much of it holds no current or future commercial value. Many universities 
and public research institutions have a stated preference and a policy to license their IP widely 
rather than to a single entity in order to get maximum public good. It is observed that this creates 
a hold-up problem, as most new technologies require further investment to develop lack financial 
commitment (a pull force), as private investors realize that competition (wider-scale licensing) 
reduces their ability to recoup their expenses for further development [20]. 
 
Institutional Structures 
Mahoney [41] suggests clans or clusters would be optimally suited to manage knowledge in this 
phase. It is also suggested that hybrid institutional structures (B, D, F, and G in Figure 1.4) in the 
realm of networked knowledge would pool IP that would be licensed or cross licensed with 
ongoing research communities [20]. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
An analysis of two separate business case studies attempting to commercialize PDVs has been 
presented. Situated within the theoretical framework of transaction forms and institutional 
structures, this section offered a detailed analysis of the types of knowledge generated and used, 
and the institutions required to handle the transactions and relationships in each phase of 
development. Thesis findings indicate that the dominant institutional structure during the 
research phase is clans (research cluster). It is indicated that transaction costs have been reduced 
by building on background knowledge from informal inter-institutional relationships in localized 
research clusters. Analysis of the gestation phase indicates joint venture is the dominant 
institutional structure, with shared investment and equity. The literature and thesis projections 
suggest SMEs partner with companies that have established manufacturing facilities and 
marketing networks in the adoption phase. The literature suggests clusters would be optimal 
institutions in the knowledge stock phase. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Vaccines are considered to be one of the most successful and cost effective weapons against 
infectious diseases to date [3]. Traditionally, vaccines have been produced to provide protective 
immunity prior to exposure to infection causing microorganism (prophylactic vaccines), but 
vaccines (or immunotherapeutics) that can stimulate immunity in an already infected individual 
are also gaining importance [4]. 
 
Vaccines can be classified based on their constitution: killed, intact virus; live, weakened virus; 
killed, intact bacteria; live, attenuated (or weakened) viruses; a mixture of inactivated toxins; 
killed, “disrupted” viruses; and a mixture of highly purified complex sugars taken from bacterial 
coats or capsules. Newer approaches that have been adopted include subunit and recombinant 
vaccines. Gene-based and virus-like particles (VLPs) are new vaccine technologies in the R&D 
stages. Novel adjuvants and delivery systems are also being developed to complement the 
emerging vaccine technologies. 
 
Vaccines have made a comeback from being considered low-profit, high-risk biological products 
to high-profile stars due to a multitude of factors including multibillion dollar sales, pandemic 
influenza demand, and increased public and private investment in vaccines. 
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Currently, licensed vaccines produced in mammalian cell lines, yeast, and the common enteric 
bacterium E. coli have their associated technical problems, including scalability, contamination, 
and complex modifications. A decade-old R&D project of developing vaccines in plants has 
yielded promising results addressing the above-mentioned issues to a great extent with the added 
benefit of faster and cheaper production; these are proposed to play an important role in 
complementing conventional vaccine supply [12].  
 
The 2009–2010 influenza pandemic presents an opportunity to capitalize on the strengths of 
PDVs. Considering competitive advantages in terms of higher speed and lower cost that are of 
great importance in pandemics, PDVs are clearly positioned to complement, if not substitute, 
conventional pandemic (and seasonal) influenza vaccine supply. 
 
5.1.1 Public Good Vs. Private Interests 
Public, market, and voluntary sectors have already been reviewed in section 3.2 (and Figure 1.4). 
The public sector pursues policies to maximize the interests of society altogether. It is optimally 
suited to create public-good, know-why scientific knowledge and uses a social welfare 
evaluation framework for decision making. The market sector owns property and attempts to 
maximize profits on those investments. It uses valuation models derived from accountancy to 
optimize the net present value of investments in technology development [20].  
 
According to Phillips and Dierker [109], since the 1980s, the government policies  aimed at 
accelerating private research and commercialization have resulted in private ownership in 
agricultural biotechnology, which has created certain challenges and a shifting of benefits to 
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private entities. These challenges include the slowing down of basic research generation, 
restricted freedom to operate at the development stage, and negative impact on consumer 
acceptance (and therefore commercialization) due to a shortage of independent verifiable 
research on health, safety, and economic impacts of new agricultural biotechnology products. 
 
Public good and private interests in vaccine innovation can be best understood from the critical 
analysis of push and pull force mechanisms. Relation of push and pull mechanisms to innovation 
process has been discussed in section 2.2.  
 
5.2 Research Work Done 
A broad approach to research has been undertaken in this thesis focusing on an interdisciplinary 
approach to analyzing PDV innovation. Sections of this thesis have been dedicated to presenting 
the potential benefits of PDVs in terms of cost efficiency and timeline of production while 
maintaining quality and sterility. This presentation ultimately forms the basis of exploring PDVs 
as an option in achieving self sufficiency of vaccine production against infectious diseases in 
developing and underdeveloped countries. The institutions responsible for vaccine innovation, 
introduction, and regulation in Canada have been mapped. A detailed analysis of the regulatory 
environment for biotechnology products with secondary input from general food and drug 
regulation has been undertaken and documented. This analysis and discussion serves as an 
important resource for academic, government, and industry discourse on potential regulatory 
framework for PDVs. An analysis of social issues surrounding vaccines and GM crops with 
implications for PDVs has been presented. A study on current and emerging frameworks for 
improving access to vaccines in LMI countries has also been presented. 
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Socio-economic frameworks of knowledge generation and use, and organizational forms have 
been used to critically analyze PDV innovation in Canada. Networked knowledge is of particular 
interest in this thesis, and the ways companies do transactions in research and product 
development networks have been presented. Also, it was found that (i) new research-intensive 
biotechnology SMEs can reduce their transaction costs by working in research networks 
(primarily PPP), and (ii) by forming strategic partnerships with companies that have established 
manufacturing and distribution networks, these SMEs increased their chances of accessing 
capital and other resources. This significantly increases probability of commercial success by 
SMEs in a highly competitive environment of the global vaccine business. 
 
5.3 Policy Implications 
Policy implication findings from this research project for the public sector and private industry 
are documented below. 
 
5.3.1 Public Sector 
The immense public good importance of vaccines has already been established earlier in this 
chapter (section 5.1.1). Governments worldwide should recognize this importance and include 
plans for introducing new and improved vaccines into their national procurements. PDVs are 
well positioned to take the lead in this respect, especially in the developing and underdeveloped 
countries, because of faster and cheaper production. In addition, governments worldwide, 
including those of developed countries, should recognize, facilitate, and streamline introduction 
of PDVs to complement pandemic vaccine supply for shorter production times, safety, and 
socio-economic advantages. It was concluded in a 2008 publication that the remaining scientific 
109 
 
and technological challenges being surmountable, the successful strategy for PDVs has to rely on 
continued public support as an investment in public good [12].   
 
An interesting model of vaccine development is PREVENT. As discussed in section 2.2 (Control 
Priorities and Health Capacity Pull), PREVENT is a public vaccine initiative that will act as a 
catalyst by conducting pre-clinincal and clinical trials to make vaccine candidates attractive for 
receptor manufacturing companies by shouldering the risk of early-stage vaccine development. 
PREVENT has significant public investment in terms of funding from Networks of Centre of 
Excellence—Centres of Excellence for Commercialization and Research, usage of publicly 
funded research facilities at VIDO, and leveraging the expertise of publicly funded scientists and 
researchers. PREVENT will continue to benefit commercially and scientifically should it build 
on background knowledge from informal institutional relationships in the research network. 
Building on background knowledge from informal institutional relationships in the research 
network was shown in subsection 4.3.1 (Transaction Forms and Institutional Structures > 
Characteristics) to reduce transaction costs. As PREVENT derives its strength in pre-clinical and 
clinical research, it is important in the early stages to identify and build relationship with 
potential companies who would be interested in moving the vaccine candidate from clinical stage 
to manufacture and distribution. PREVENT is significant to both local and national economies, 
as it employs scientists and researchers locally, and provides potential vaccine manufacture and 
sales nationally. 
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Public sector support for PDVs is discussed in the paragraphs below. With the Pharma-Planta 
Project (2.2 subsection Technology Push), initially started by the EU, public funding as a 
technology push for PDVs is coming to fruition in the form of spinoffs and product development 
collaborations with the industry, as documented below.   
 
The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft and its wholly owned subsidiary Fraunhofer USA, Inc. are non-
profit R&D and contract research organizations. Fraunhofer USA, Inc. with its headquarters in 
Plymouth, Michigan, presently is composed of seven research and development units, and the 
Fraunhofer Centers, including the Fraunhofer Center for Manufacturing Innovation (CMI) and 
the Fraunhofer Center for Molecular Biotechnology (CMB). CMB, CMI, the Boston University 
College of Engineering, and the biopharmaceutical company iBio, Inc. in Newark, Delaware 
have developed a fully automated, scalable, natural (non-GM) green plant technology platform 
that, according to news release, efficiently produces large quantities of vaccines and therapeutics 
within weeks of disease outbreaks [115]. A three-year research collaboration between CMB, 
CMI, and the Boston University resulted in this unique PDV technology platform with scalable 
automated processes, and it further established the first cGMP (current Good Manufacturing 
Practices) pilot manufacturing facility located in Newark, Delaware. The design and construction 
of the pilot facility was facilitated by public funding in the form of support from the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the US Department of Defense under the 
Accelerated Manufacturing of Pharmaceuticals program, along with funding from the State of 
Delaware. This technology platform (iBioLaunch™) uses plant viral vector technology 
developed by CMB and robotic automation designed by CMI, and its IP/technology is owned by 
iBio (a PPP model). On 20 September 2010, an IND application filed by iBio, Inc. with the US 
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FDA for a vaccine candidate was accepted. It is anticipated iBio, Inc.’s rapid vaccine production 
facility will play a crucial role in addressing and containing future pandemics and emerging 
biological threats. iBio, Inc. is also party to an agreement supporting access to medicines in 
developing and underdeveloped countries. According to the agreement, CMB will use iBio’s 
technology under a non-exclusive, non-royalty-bearing grant to develop and test new Global 
Health Vaccines funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (research and product 
development funds push, see section 2.2, subsection Research and Product Development Funds 
Push) [94]. 
 
G-Con, LLC and the Texas A&M University System have designed Project GreenVax in Bryan, 
Texas to show proof of concept initially to produce candidate H1N1 vaccines [116]. The idea is 
to produce the vaccine in a large-scale production facility with a projected final scale capacity of 
100 million doses per month using tobacco plants grown hydroponically in a contained 
environment. Majority of funding for the project is public funding provided by DARPA. 
 
It has been well documented (see the two DARPA funded projects above) and argued [16] that 
the apparent acceptance by the relevant funding agencies in the USA of rapid response vaccines 
easily produced in plants and aimed at potential bio-terror and pandemic agents such as 
influenza, anthrax, and haemorrhagic fever viruses  is a positive step in the right direction. It is 
also argued that niche market of “orphan disease” and low-margin vaccines such as for Lassa 
fever, the South American haemorrhagic fever viruses, meningitis vaccine (see Meningitis 
Vaccine Project in 2.3), and other low-volume markets would be obvious first targets, other than 
the military options if acceptance does happen soon [16]. Increasing acceptability in the long 
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term could mean a shift to the mainstream high volume⁄low cost generics market, which 
potentially can be realized by PDV technology in ensuring access to medicines in the 
undeveloped and developing countries. 
 
5.3.2 Private Companies 
The industry as a driver of vaccine innovation in terms of R&D, manufacturing, and distribution 
is well recognized, and has been covered in section 5.1. The industry is anticipated to actively 
participate in the vaccine innovation, playing an equal role in social responsibility, 
environmental stewardship, and positive economic activity, along with the public and voluntary 
sectors.  
 
It is argued that it will take the incremental successes of plant-made therapeutics (such as 
essential metabolic enzymes and monoclonal antibodies), followed by vaccines for 
livestock/companion animals and human therapeutics such as insulin and vaccines (e.g., Icon 
Genetics/Bayer Innovation’s patient-specific vaccines for the treatment of non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma) to finally tip the balance for broad-based acceptability of PDVs for human use [16]. 
The thesis shows new research-intensive biotechnology SMEs can reduce transaction costs by 
forming PPPs in research networks, and can gain access to capital and other resources by 
forming strategic partnership with other companies that have established manufacturing and 
distribution networks. These factors are attributed to increased probability of the SME to succeed 
commercially in highly competitive environment of global vaccine business. 
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5.4 Challenges and Limitations 
As no PDV product has reached the market yet, events under study are still under development. 
Based on this limiting factor, the final story might look different. 
 
5.5 Extensions 
So far, this analysis has focused on biotechnology business case studies in North American PDV 
innovation. An extension of this research program would be to study PDV innovation 
worldwide. This would include approaches for rapid, streamlined, and sustained introduction and 
adoption of PDVs against infectious diseases in developing and underdeveloped countries where 
they are most urgently required. Regulatory systems differ by geographic regions, countries (e.g., 
Europe, Asia, and South America), and social dynamics. Studying the potential introduction and 
adoption of PDVs is important because of its role as a LMI country oriented public health tool. 
 
5.5.1 Future Work 
Further work needs to be done to analyze institutional structures in developing and 
underdeveloped countries where the vaccines would be manufactured and distributed. This work 
would streamline and facilitate the humanitarian adoption of PDVs to these regions. 
Interdisciplinary study is strongly needed to better understand the principles and implications of 
international trade agreements and access to vaccines to facilitate the adoption of PDVs.   
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